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Law in the Context of "Globalisation":
A Framework of Analysis
HEBA SHAMS*
"It is a wonderful feeling to recognise the unity of a complex of phenomena that to direct
observation appear to be quite separate things."l
Albert Einstein
I. Introduction
Sir Joseph Gold was an international civil servant and international legal scholar par
excellence. Though this author never had the privilege of knowing Sir Joseph, as a young
aspiring international economic law scholar, she has touched his work for numerous re-
search and teaching occasions and has been influenced by his enduring commitment to the
role of international institutions and international law in bringing some semblance of ra-
tionality and order to our international economic and monetary environment. This author
has been further impressed by two aspects of Sir Joseph's writings: his precision and clarity
using legal language and legal constructs, and the innovativeness of his analyses in helping
to provide workable institutional and legal solutions to the changing demands being made
upon the IMF. This author cannot help but wonder how Sir Joseph would have approached
analysing the apparent and real tensions between the current onslaught of the 'globalisation'
process and the role of law and legal institutions. It is in this context that the author has
the great privilege of contributing to this Symposium Issue in honour of Sir Joseph Gold.
For over three decades lawyers, sociologists, economists, political scientists, and many
others have been noticing an unfamiliar intensification of a number of disparate phenomena
in their surrounding:
" production processes are fragmented and stretched across borders;
• the number of transnational non-governmental organisations have increased phenomenally,
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" companies with foreign operations have increased and the assets of the larger ones
exceed the GNP of various countries;
" international organisations such as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank are ac-
quiring greater powers and competence;
" cross-border criminal organisations have developed economic power that rivals that of
the multinational corporations;
" communication technology is progressing at an unprecedented rate;
" countries worldwide are changing their regulatory regimes towards more liberalisation;
" separatist and fundamentalist movements have acquired new momentum all around the
world; and
" individual national governments are increasingly unable to control their territories and
enforce national policies.
In their attempts to understand these various phenomena, analysts from the different
disciplines discovered an intricate web of causal relations that linked them all into a single
set of intertwined processes. This unity has been expressed in the emergence of the term
"globalisation." To describe this set of seemingly disparate processes. This article attempts
to devise a possible working framework of analyses of globalisation that could be useful for
policymakers, lawyers, and legal academics. In so doing, this article will explore a number
of those relevant themes. First, Part I addresses what globalisation means using cross-
disciplinary insight. Part II of this article will propose a definition and elaborate on its main
elements. Building on this definition, Part m will then address how globalisation came
about by discussing the two primary instruments of globalisation, i.e., technology and regu-
lation. The article continues in Part IV with a discussion of the relative nature of the process
that defines the temporal scope of this study by defining the historical parameters of glob-
alisation. Part V will consider certain problems that arise respecting governance issues.
Lastly, Part VI draws certain concluding observations.
11. Understanding Globalisation
The use of the word "globe" to refer to our planet dates back to the sixteenth century when
Magellan circled the earth and proved beyond doubt that it has a spherical shape. According
to the Oxford English Dictionary it was not until 1892 that the word "global" began to be
used to mean, "involving the whole world. "2 "Globalise" and "globalism," on the other hand,
were not coined until 1944.1 Despite sporadic references to the concepts of globalism and
globality in academic writing during the 1960s and 1970s, the term globalisation did not
acquire its academic significance until the mid-1980s. Since then it has pervaded every dis-
cipline and many other languages across the world have coined similar terms. 4
The term's popularity did not serve the cause for precision and clarity. Journalists, pol-
iticians, and business gurus used the word globalisation extensively to denote a variety of
meanings, or even no meaning at all. Within academic discourse, the term was further
2. ENGLISH OXFORD DICTIONARY 582 (2d ed. 1989).
3. OLIVER L. REISER & BLODWEN DAVIES, PLANETARY DEMOCRACY: AN INTRODUCTION TO SCIENTIFIC Hu-
MANISM AND APPLIED SEMAN IrCS (1944), in JAN AART SCIOLTE, GLOBALIZArION: A CRIICAL IrRODUCTION 43
(2000).
4. For a survey of such terms, see SCHOLTa, supra note 3, at 43.
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muddled partly because of cross-disciplinary discourse and partly because it was often used
loosely to give a pretence of novelty to old debates. The situation was not any better in
legal debate, despite the more pressing need for precision. For this reason, this section
attempts to clarify the evolving concept of globalisation in a way that provides a better
foundation for the debate over legal implications of this process.
The study of globalisation is exemplary of the fusion of disciplines at the end of the
twentieth century.5 Contrasted with the nineteenth century, where disciplinarity and spe-
cialisation find their origin, the second half of the twentieth century witnessed an acceler-
ated fusion between disciplines induced by growing consciousness of the inter-links between
the various social and natural phenomena.6 While cross-disciplinary enquiry is inevitable
for understanding such a comprehensive social process as globalisation, the task is not easy.
Each discipline has its own terminology and internal debates. To benefit from the various
disciplinary insights, one must master the terminology and grasp the analysis without get-
ting entangled in the internal debates.
The main disciplines that contributed to the analysis of globalisation are Sociology,7
International Relations,8 Economics, 9 Political Geography,10 and Communication Studies."
In their examination of the process they vacillate between two sets of questions: the process
of globalisation and how that process affects their disciplines and the standard debates
within those disciplines. The present author is only concerned with the first set of questions,
which centres on a number of specific themes:
* definition (What is globalisation?);
* evidence (Is it a reality orfantasy?);
* history (When did it start?);
* causes (Why and how did it happen?);
* measurement (What is the extent ofglobalisation?);
* implications (How does it affect our social institutions?);
* evaluation (Is it good or bad?); and
* future (What is the outcome of the process and is it reversible?).
5. RoLA,,ND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE 165 (1992). It is in fact a
field of disciplinary, interdisciplinary, metadisciplinary, and paradisciplinary contestaton.
6. For a case for the fusion of social sciences, see Immanuel Wallerstein, Some Reflections on History, the Social
Sciences, and Politics, in THE CAPITALIST WORLD-EcONOMY vii-xii (Immanuel Wallerstein ed., 1979). For a case
for the unity of knowledge and the fusion of humanities, natural, and social sciences, see WILSON, supra
note 1.
7. See MALCOLM WATERS, GLOBALIZATION (1995); see also ROBERTSON, supra note 5; see also ANroNY GID-
DENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY (1991); see also GLOBAL CULTURE: NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION,
AND MODERNITY: A THEORY, CULTURE & SOCIETY (Mike Featherstone ed., 1990).
8. See SCHOLTE, supra note 3; see also THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO IN-
TERNATIONAL RELATIONS (ohn Baylis & Steve Smith eds., 1997); see also JAMES N. ROSENAU, TURBULANCE IN
WORLD POLITICS: A THEORY OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY (1990).
9. See ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21ST CENTURY CAPITALISM
(1991); see also PAUL HIRST & GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION IN QUESTION: THE INTERNATIONAL ECON-
OMY AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF GovERNANCE (1996).
10. DAvID HARvEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL
CHANGE (1990); DAVID IHARvEY, SPACES OF HOPE (2000).
11. MARSHALL McLuIAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN (1964); Majorie Ferguson,
Electronic Media and the Redefining ofTime and Space, in PUBLIC COMMUNICATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVES: FUTURE
DIRECTIONS FOR MEDIA RESEARCH (Majorie Ferguson ed., 1990); Majorie Ferguson, The Mythology of Globali-
zation, 7 Euw. J. COMM. 69 (1992).
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A. CROss-DISCIPLINARY REVIEW
The problem of defining globalisation cannot be exaggerated; it is the first problem that
faces the student of globalisation. This initial lack of agreement on a definition undermines
all the debates over the reality, the value, the implications, and the future of globalisation.
Analysts fail to agree with each other simply because they are referring to different things.
To some, globalisation is nothing but intensive market liberalisation. This definition makes
the term simply another vehicle for the debate over free trade versus protectionism and
market economy versus command and control. To others, globalisation and international-
isation are synonymous, pre-empting any debates about the implications of the process for
governance and other social structures on the ground that there is nothing new to discuss.12
Another strand of the globalisation analysis has confused the concept with unification or
homogenisation. This confusion is partly linguistic. Unified or all-inclusive was one meaning
that the word global has acquired during its history.3 A certain strand within cultural studies
that emphasised the emergence of a common consumer culture specifically promoted this
meaning. According to this view, common patterns of consumption create a collective identity
based on those consumption patterns. 14 Products consumed worldwide, like Coca-Cola,
McDonalds, and Levis, are more than simple consumption items catering to specific needs;
instead they are modes of self-expression and source of identity. s The spread of such con-
sumption items across the world and the value connotations attached to them have led some
to speak of global cultural homogeneity, i.e., globalisation as homogenisation.
The concepts of "interdependence" and "transnationalisation" are yet another two con-
cepts that figure extensively in the writings on "globalisation" and are often used synony-
mously. In fact, many issues currently discussed under the heading of globalisation were
discussed in the 1970s and 1980s under the headings of interdependence and transnation-
alisation. 16 In other words, these two concepts actually preceded globalisation and were
later integrated within it.
Interdependence "refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries
or among actors in different countries." 17 In other words, it means that what happens in
one country, affects or determines what happens in another country. Transnationalisation,
on the other hand, refers to a state of affairs where the states are no longer the only actors
and where cross-border relations are taking place between non-state entities such as cor-
porations, civil associations, or individuals." The concepts of interdependence and trans-
nationalisation are linked causally. Transnational relations work as transmission belts, mak-
ing each country more sensitive to what happens in another country. Hence, transnational
12. For a review of the various usage of the term that confuses it with other concepts, see SCHOLTE, supra
note 3, at 44-46 (listing four redundant concepts of globalisation: globalisation as internationalisation, liber-
alisation, universalisation, or westernisation).
13. ENGLISH OXFORD DICTIONARY 582 (2d ed. 1989).
14. Majorie Ferguson, The Mythology about Globalization, 7 EUR. J. CoMm. 69, 80 (1992).
15. WATERS, supra note 7, at 140.
16. See, e.g., ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN
TRA.NSITION (1977); JAMES N. ROSENAU, THE STUDY OF GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE: ESSAYS ON THE TRANSNA-
TIONALIZATION OF WORLD AFFAIRS (1980); MICHAEL ARTIs & SYLVIA OSTRY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
COORDINATION, (1986).
17. KEoHANE & NYE, supra note 16, at 8.
18. See id. at 24-25.
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relations cause and intensify the condition of interdependence. 9 This section will not dis-
cuss at this stage the differences and the links between those two concepts and the concept
of globalisation, but will later on in this paper.
So far this article has indicated that the term globalisation has been used to mean lib-
eralisation, internationalisation, homogenisation, interdependence, or transnationalisation.
Many globalisation theorists were discontent with this situation. They believed that if glob-
alisation is to become a conceptual tool for the analysis of social change, then it must have
a distinct meaning. For this reason they directed their attention to defining the concept in
a way that distinguishes it from all other related concepts.
David Harvey refers to "time-space compression"20 as characteristic of our contemporary
condition. Roland Robertson while accepting the "compression of the world" as the objec-
tive aspect of globalisation finds "the intensification of consciousness of the world as
whole"" to be the subjective element of the process and the most distinctive feature of
globalisation in its contemporary form. Anthony Giddens, on the other hand, emphasises
what he calls "the disembedding of social systems," meaning "the 'lifting out' of social
relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans
of time-space."22 He defined globalisation as "the development of social and economic
relationships stretching world-wide."23 Jan Aart Scholte defines globalisation as "the rise of
'supraterritorial' relations between peoples." 4 These relations transcend territorial space25
and are not constrained by "location, distance, and borders."6 Malcolm Waters similarly
defines globalisation; it is "[a] social process in which the constraints of geography on social
and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they
are receding."27
In addition to these definitions, which could be said to emphasise the core or catalyst of
social change, one encounters another set of definitions emphasising the direction of this
change, i.e., where this process of globalisation is heading. According to the Encyclopaedia
of Business and Management: "Globalization is the process of increasing integration in
world civilization."2 s Richard O'Brien speaks of the "end of geography" and asserts that we
reach this condition only as the "nation becomes irrelevant" and a "global, integral whole"
emerges. 29 Anthony Giddens asserts, "for some purposes we have to regard the world as
forming a single social order."10
In sum, globalisation has been used by some as synonymous with already existing concepts
such as internationalisation, liberalisation, homogenisation, interdependence, and trans-
nationalisation. While these processes are linked to the process of globalisation in various
19. Id. at 26.
20. HARvEY, supra note 10, at 240.
21. ROBERTSON, Supra note 5, at 8.
22. GIDDENS, supra note 7, at 21.
23. ANTHONY GIDDENS, SOCIOLOGY 727 (1989).
24. SCHOLTE, supra note 3, at 46.
25. Id. at 48.
26. Id. at 49.
27. WATERS, supra note 7, at 3.
28. Bruce Kogut & Michelle Gittelman, Globalization, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS AND
MANAGEMENT, Vol. 2 (Malcolm Warner ed., 1996).
29. RICHARD O'BRIEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: THE END OF GEOGRAPHY 5 (1992).
30. GIDDENS, supra note 23, at 727.
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ways, globalisation theorists rejected this confusion and worked on developing definitions
of globalisation that bring out its distinctive characteristics. Their definitions of the concept
are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they merely emphasise different aspects of the process
and look at it from different angles. In this article, I will develop a definition of the concept
that reconciles the previous definitions and clarifies the links between globalisation and
other similar concepts.
B. A PROPOSED DEFINITION
This part endeavours to extract out of the myriad of studies on globalisation a straight-
forward working definition for lawyers. In doing so, this article will try to avoid what might
seem to be jargon, but in describing this specific new phenomenon one must use some
unfamiliar words for their descriptive power. Familiar words may not capture the idea's real
content and may only continue to confuse it with older concepts. 1 Questions guiding the
following analysis are: (1) What is common between the various new phenomena that we
are witnessing around us?32; (2) What are the differences and the relationship between
globalisation and the other concepts of liberalisation, internationalisation, homogenisation,
interdependence, and transnationalisation?; and (3) How do the various definitions of glob-
alisation fit together?
There are two prominent features to the examples earlier discussed. 33 They all express a
process of change or transformation, and space is a central element in this change. Taking
the first example on the list, production is one of society's main economic activities. In the
past, production activities used to be localised within the one state's territory; thus products
used to have a distinct nationality. We are now witnessing an increasing fragmentation of
the production process whereby products are the outcome of a series of activities stretching
across various countries. As a result, it is increasingly difficult to determine the nationality
of certain products. Robert Reich, an economist who built a thesis around this observation,
offers the following example: "A jet air plane is designed in the state of Washington and in
Japan, and assembled in Seattle, with tail cones from Canada, special tail sections from
China and Italy, and engines from Britain. '34 What is the plane's nationality as a product?
Where did its production take place?
The same two elements of change and space are captured in the definitions of globalisa-
tion surveyed above. 35 David Harvey talks about "time-space compression," Roland Rob-
ertson discusses the "compression of the world," Jan Aart Scholte refers to the "rise of
supraterritorial relations," Richard O'Brien foresees the "end of geography," Anthony Gid-
dens emphasises "the 'lifting out' of social relations from local contexts," and Malcolm
Waters finds the centre of change in the recession of "the constraints of geography on social
and cultural arrangements." 36 Thus, globalisation is always about change, which is often
spatial change.
Although the term globalisation is geographic in nature and the element of space is
incorporated within it, it is not always about spatial change. Referring again to the list of
31. See SCHOLTE, supra note 3, at 49.
32. See Part I supra (list of phenomena occurring over the last three decades).
33. See id.
34. REICH, supra note 9, at 112.
35. See Part l.A supra.
36. See WATERS, supra note 7, at 3.
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phenomena at the beginning of this article, the prominence of non-state actors (i.e., cor-
porations, criminal organisations, civil associations, and international organisations) and
the relative decline of state power are both important elements of the globalisation process.
Globalisation is used for its omission of any reference to the state as much as it is used for
its geographic connotation. When we speak of "global" relations, we often mean cross-
border or worldwide interactions between non-state actors. Global is used because it omits
any reference to the state as the geographic scope of social relations and the dominant actor.
This article chooses to define globalisation as a process of social change identified with
a change in the space within which we conduct our social relations and a growing con-
sciousness of this spatial change. This definition is neither all-inclusive, nor is it entirely
exclusive. It does not include within it all the characteristic features of globalisation; instead
it is confined to a change in the geography of social life. The definition fails to indicate the
distinctive direction of the spatial change and its accompanying consciousness, hence al-
lowing a random number of spatial changes to fall within it.
The only case for such a skeletal definition is that the process to which globalisation
refers is too dialectic and complex to be compressed into a short, comprehensive, and
exclusive definition. The terms proposed above simply place globalisation genericallywithin
the processes of social change and identify spatial change and its accompanying conscious-
ness as core features of the process. The proposed definition also implies that there are
other defining features.
1. A Process of Social Change
Defining globalisation as a process of social change is unhelpful without an understanding
of what "social change" means. This is specifically important when we realise that change
is a constant in every society. New technologies are frequently introduced, new laws are
enacted, old laws repealed, governments change, and society's economic performance un-
dergoes periodic fluctuations. Do these changes constitute social change? Or does social
change have another more specific meaning?
Social change is not just any change occurring within the society. Changes like those men-
tioned above might constitute triggers or symptoms of social change processes. They do not,
however, represent processes of social change in their own right. Change must satisfy certain
criteria in order to qualify as a form of social change. Definitions of social change vary. Some
are more restrictive than others. One frequently quoted definition provides "social change is
any nonrepetitive alteration in the established modes of behaviour in society."" According to
this definition, social change takes place only when the social structure is altered.s This
includes changes in group relationships, group norms, or group roles.19
Others define social change more broadly.- They view social change more as a process
rather than an outcome. This view encompasses a variety of changes in the society that
could be fast or slow, incremental or comprehensive, involving individual modes of conduct
37. Lawrence Friedman & Jack Landinsky, Law as an Insmment of Incremental Social Change, an unpublished
paper first presented at the 1967 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, in LAw AND
CHANGE IN MODERN AMERIcA 3 (Joel B. Grossman & Mary H. Grossman eds., 1971).
38. Id. See also GmiDENS, supra note 23, at 632-33.
39. Friedman & Landinsky, supra note 37.
40. See LAw AND CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 3-6 (Joel B. Grossman & Mary H. Grossman eds., 1971);
see also ROBERT A. DODGSHON, SOCIETY IN TIME AND SPACE: A GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE ON CHANGE 27, 45-
47 (Alan R. H. Baker et al. eds., 2000).
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or group norms or patterns of relationships.41 The justification for this broad approach is
that what might seem as incremental or merely quantitative form of change often results
in more profound changes in the social structure. Social change is rarely revolutionary;
rather, it is often incremental and cumulative.
The debate about whether globalisation is a reality or a myth can be restated as a debate
regarding whether globalisation constitutes a process of social change. Are there really
significant changes to our social life that can be termed globalisation? The differences in
answering this question can sometimes be traced back to differences in understanding social
change. Those who view social change as essentially a revolutionary event of displacement
where one system replaces another would tend to reject globalisation as a process of social
change. This is simply because our social institutions, such as capitalism, as a mode of
production and the state as an institution of governance seem to remain in place. Others
who define social change more broadly and include within its scope changes that are short
of displacement tend to view globalisation as a very complex and far reaching process of
social change that might eventually settle into more radical systemic changes.
This article clearly subscribes to a broad definition of social change and places global-
isation categorically within its boundaries. Capitalism remains the dominant mode of pro-
duction while undergoing significant changes. With the expansion of commodification, 4
capitalism is expanding by creating new objects of accumulation.45 The corporation as the
main vehicle or organisational structure of capitalism is also subject to fundamental
changes.44 The market as the main institution for distribution is expanding geographically
into new areas. The state as the dominant structure of governance for the past two centuries
continues, subject to fundamental changes in its role and relationship to other institutions
and even to the individual. These changes in our social life qualify severely and collectively
as forms of social change under the broader approach to the concept and possibly under
the more restrictive approach.
Continuity is always an element in change. This is even more important to acknowledge
in studying globalisation. The process of globalisation creates new institutions and rela-
tionships while maintaining the older ones. The state, for example, continues as a governing
structure but multinational organisations and private actors emerge as agents of governance.
The role of the state is redefined, but only in some contexts. In certain respects it continues
to play its governance role in the same old ways. This pattern of change repeatedly emerges
in discussing any aspect of the change introduced by the globalisation process and must be
considered in devising any tools to deal with its outcomes.
41
Some of the changes in our social life that are taking place are directly reducible to the
core element of globalisation, namely, the alteration in the geography of social relations.
Others, however, are not. Globalisation as a process of social change is therefore larger
than its geographic aspect and its consequences. As indicated earlier," globalisation refers
41. LAw AND CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA, supra note 40.
42. Commodification means turning a product into a commodity that is exchanged on the market to create
surplus. SCHOLTE, supra note 3, at 112.
43. Id. at 112-24.
44. Id. at 124-30.
45. This salient feature of change in the context of globalisation leads commentators to constantly qualify
their thesis on globalisation with a series of "buts." See id. at 8-9.
46. See Part I.B supra.
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not only to the geographic expansion beyond the state, but also to its partial loss of power
in favour of other actors.
2. A Change in the Space of Social Relations
Attempts at describing the process of globalisation have often referred to the compression
of the world. This compression is essentially a technological achievement. If distance is
measured by the time it takes to cross it, then technologies that reduce that time compress
the world. Technologies achieving significant reduction in the time to cross distances are
not new. They date back to the invention of the self-propelled ships, the railway, the tele-
graph, and the aeroplane. Such technologies rendered the world significantly smaller but
yet not small enough. The current period is significant because of the instantaneousness
with which distance can be crossed. This distinguishes globalisation from transnationali-
sation. The latter still involves crossing distances over time. It still involves here and there,
albeit they are both considerably proximate. Satellite communication and the Internet, on
the other hand, make individual instant contact between distant places possible, and thus
obliterate distance for a lot of practical purposes.
It follows then that if the difference between here and there is the distance between them,
and the distance is measured by the time it takes to cross it, then a technological innovation
reducing that time to a virtual zero has the effect of compressing here and there into a
single place. If that technology spans the globe and connects various localities, then one
can say that the whole world is being compressed into a single place. Globalisation is about
this instantaneous coverage of distance. It is about compression of the world down to a
single place.47
The compression of the world changes the space within which we conduct our social
life. This change has far reaching implications for every aspect of life. The spatial bound-
aries of our social life determine to a very far degree our economic activities, our modes of
governance, our cultural values and symbols, and our communal relations.41 A number of
differences, for example, between the hunting and gathering societies and the agrarian
societies developed out of the change in the space within which they lived. This change
influenced their family, governance, and religious structures. For this reason, the impact of
globalisation on our social life and its political, cultural, and economic structures preoc-
cupies students of globalisation and triggers a process of redefinition within all disciplines,
including the legal one.
David Harvey and Roland Robertson both focus on the compression of space. By con-
trast, all the other surveyed definitions focus on the way social relations are positioned in
this new space. When Jan Aart Scholte speaks about the rise of supraterritoriality and
Anthony Giddens refers to the '"lifting out' of social relations from the locality," what they
are actually saying is that the compression of the world affects social relations by taking
them out of the territory of the nation/state and stretching them across the world. The
47. That is the difference between the definition I offered and Roland Robertson's. Robertson traces glob-
alisation back to the nineteenth century technologies that compressed distances significantly without obliter-
ating them, whereas I confine globalisation to the obliteration of distance by the global spread of technologies
of instantaneous communication. Robertson is, however, aware of the distinction. He describes early com-
munication technologies as transnational communication while describing the instantaneous communication
technologies as global communication. ROBERTSON, supra note 5, at 58-59.
48. See SCHOLTI, supra note 3, at 46. For a discussion of the importance of space in understanding social
change, see DODGSHON, supra note 40.
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social relations are no longer localised; they no longer take place within a specific locality.
They are happening on earth, but where on earth we cannot specify without resorting to
arbitrariness or formality. Malcolm Waters and Richard O'Brien also had a similar ap-
proach; they were both concerned that the compression of the world renders the geographic
constraints on social relations irrelevant.
Speaking of compression of space may give the impression that all our social relations
and processes are happening within this new space and that locality or territoriality no
longer exists, it is very important to dispel such a perception immediately. As indicated
earlier, globalisation creates new space for our social relations, but it does not totally replace
the old one. The "global" and the "local" coexist, and that is what makes understanding
and organising our social life at the beginning of the twenty-first century more difficult.
4 9
This contrast between the various definitions indicates that our concern with globalisa-
tion is not concern with the instantaneous physical connection between the various local-
ities, but with the implications for our social structures: economic, political, and cultural.
On this basis it is important to remember that while the core of globalisation is the com-
pression of the world and the consciousness of this compression, the term is often used to
refer to a much broader process of change.
3. Consciousness of the Spatial Change
In reality, the globe is still as big as it has always been. The world did not compress in a
physical sense. It compressed in our perception just because we are capable, through tech-
nological means, to stretch ourselves across and reach its furthest ends in virtually no time.
For this reason our consciousness of the compression is as much an element of the definition
of globalisation as is the new global space that technological capabilities have made possible.
For some, this consciousness is actually the most distinctive feature of our contemporary
globalisation.s° It is expressed in the extensive use of the words "global" and "globalisation"
in daily parlance and the emergence of equivalent terms in all the main languages around
the world. It is also expressed in our persistent concern with organising the whole world,
i.e., with the problem of global governance."'
Satellite communication technologies obliterating distance are now available for the in-
dividual. They are home commodities in increasing parts of the world. For this reason, the
consciousness of the world as a single place or at least as a small place is happening at the
individual level. The process of globalisation is a micro level process not just a macro level
process. This distinguishes it very clearly from the processes of internationalisation and
interdependence. 2 In both those processes the focus has been on the relationships between
macro entities, mainly between the states. Both Roland Robertson 3 and Jan Aart Scholte
trace this consciousness back to the 1960s and explain it by media developments in that
49. This point is made repeatedly by writers on globalisation. See, e.g., HARvEY, THE CONDITION OF POST-
MODERNITY, supra note 10, at 293-96 (indicating that collapse of spatial barriers in certain respects accentuates
the importance of locality).
50. ROBERTSON, supra note 5, at 78 ("'Globality' refers to the circumstance of extensive awareness of the
world as a whole..
51. Id. at 54.
52. WOLFGANG H. REINICKE, GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY: GOVERNING WITHOUT GOVERNMENT? 11 (1998). He
makes the same point albeit in a narrower context. He distinguishes between globalisation and interdependence
by describing the former as microeconomic process while the latter is a macroeconomic one.
53. ROBERTSON, supra note 5, at 9.
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decade. According to Scholte, "[g]lobal consiousness perhaps gained its single greatest boost
by the transworld publication in 1966 of pictures taken from outer space showing the earth
as one location."5 4
Incorporating our consciousness of the world as an element of the definition of global-
isation expresses a certain reality. Globalisation would not have happened without human
interference. This is not just because technologies are human inventions, but also because
to use technologies we must allow such usage by enacting enabling laws and regulations.
Globalisation theorists express this fact by saying that globalisation is a reflexive process;"5
it occurs as a result of endogenous as well as exogenous factors.5 6 In conclusion, for working
purposes, this article suggests the following definition: Globalisation is a process of social
change that is identified with and substantially triggered by a change in the space within
which we conduct our social relations. Both the objective geographic change and the sub-
jective consciousness of this change are defining elements of this process. Globalisation is
distinct from internationalisation, liberalisation, homogenisation, transnationalisation, and
interdependence. However, each of these processes has influenced, as well as been influ-
enced, by the globalisation process.
M. Deciphering Causes (How Did Globalisation Happen?)
The question of what produced the process of globalisation is one of the main questions
preoccupying students of this process. The causal link between globalisation and capitalism
is fairly well established." Rationalism, as the core structure of our knowledge, is also
contended as another force behind the process.58 The most cited cause of globalisation,
however, is technology. Clearly technology is a main direct cause of globalisation. Tech-
nology is an instrument, an answer to how globalisation happened rather than why it hap-
pened. However, closely interconnected with the technological advance is regulation.
A. THE OBVIous: TcHNOLOGY
As previously indicated, globalisation has a subjective element consisting of the growing
consciousness of the geographical change of our social relations and a material or objective
element. The material element finds its core in the actual geographical change of social
relations In addition to this geographic core globalisation in its material aspect is a much
broader and dialectic process. One part of this process, which is discussed later and is
paramount and specifically relevant to the present thesis, is the rearrangement of state power
and the emergence of powerful non-state actors. Each of the elements of globalisation is
to a significant degree a technological achievement. There is a consensus amongst writers
on globalisation that technology is the sine qua non cause of this process.59
54. ScHoTE, supra note 3, at 85.
55. ROBERTSON, supra note 5, at 13 (distinguishing between globalisation theory and world system theory
on the basis that the former's focus on the reflexivity of globalisation and the latter focuses on the systemic
character of the world as a whole).
56. Kogut & Gittenan, Globalization, in IrENATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT,
supra note 28, at 1650.
57. WATERS, supra note 7, at 19-26; SCHOLTE, supra note 3, at 95-99.
58. SCHOLTE, supra note 3, at 93-95.
59. For a pioneer and insightful account, albeit lacking in academic quality, of how technology brought
about globalisation, see McLumAN, supra note 11, at 3.
After three thousand years of explosion, by means of fragmentary and mechanical technologies, the
Western world is imploding. During the mechanical ages we extended our bodies in space. Today after
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Satellite pictures of the planet in 1966 showing earth as a single place were probably re-
sponsible for formulating our consciousness of earth as one place.60 Satellite broadcast, the
telephone, and the Internet continue to confirm this consciousness by bringing images of one
distant locality to another, allowing us to follow events happening thousands of miles away
as they take place and to communicate on real time basis across such distances. This instan-
taneous communication across the planet through computer mediated telecommunication
compresses space and obliterates distance, thus changing the geography of social relations.
Technological innovations that freed individual exchanges from the geographic confine-
ment of state boundaries have dealt a blow to state power and have forced the state to recon-
sider its mechanisms of governance. Digital technologies that enhance exponentially the stor-
age and processing of data further accentuate the need for change in state power or
governance. Such technologies have ended the state monopoly over information and have
made previously inconceivable amounts of information available to the individual and to
private entities, thus reconfiguring the power relationship between the state and the citizenry.
The foregoing paragraphs stated how technology helped bring about the three core
aspects of globalisation. Certain areas of technological innovation were specifically instru-
mental in bringing about this change in our social life. Information technologies are the
primary catalyst of this transformation. 61 Information technology is a broad term that in-
cludes both information processing and communication, i.e., computing and telecommu-
nication technologies.
Telecommunication means communication at a distance. Attempts at communicating at
a distance date back to the beginnings of history where people used drums, fire, and smoke
signals.6 The starting point, however, of what one commentator described as "distanceless"
communication 63 is the advent of the telegraph in the 1840s. With this invention, messages
could cross distance at unprecedented speed by using electricity. The invention of telephony
soon after has made instantaneous voice communication across borders possible.
Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century and after 150 years of inventions and
discoveries, the world is covered by a web of global information flows linking its remotest
localities. By 1990, cross-border direct-dial telephones were available in over 200 countries.
In the mid 1990s, the Cable News Network (CNN) claimed, "its transmission from sev-
enteen satellites reached some 123 million reception points in around 140 countries."64 By
mid-1998, the Internet, which started in 1969 by the U.S. Department of Defense as a
communication network to be used in the case of a nuclear attack, has secured 140 million
more than a century of electric technology, we have extended our central nervous system itself in a
global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is concerned.
See also SCHOLTE, supra note 3, at 99-101.
60. SCHOLTE, supra note 3, at 85.
61. There is large body of scholarship that studies the current process of social change as an information
revolution in which globalisation is only an outcome and a single aspect of a much larger process. See DANIEL
BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTIA. SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL FORECASTING (1973); see also MANUEL
CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORX SOCIETY (1996); see also Mark E. Hepworth, Geography of the Information
Economy, in STUDIES IN THE INFORMATION ECONOMY: URBAN AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1989).
62. For a brief and informative history of telecommunication, see Timo Kaiser et al., The FHTE Web History
of Telecommunication (1996), available at http://www.fht-esslingen.de/telehistQry/indexhaupt.html (last visited
on Dec. 18, 2000).
63. SCHOLTE, supra note 3, at 66.
64. Id. at 75-76.
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users worldwide.65 The Internet is the global technology par excellence. It can transfer
massive amounts of information around the world instantaneously and cheaply. Through
developments in computers, this information tool has become available to the individual,
sometimes even at the comfort of his own office or home.
Telecommunication technology has thus compressed space, obliterated distance, and re-
moved the geographic constraints on social interaction. Information processing technolo-
gies have in their turn made massive amounts of information available very cheaply. The
history of modem computers dates back to the Second World War where computing ma-
chines were developed to carry out military functions, such as designing missiles or breaking
secret codes.66 Computers in their early years were bulky expensive machines available only
to governments or large corporations with very limited operational capacity by today's
standards. Not until 1958 and the invention of the Integrated Circuit did computers become
increasingly smaller, cheaper, and more efficient. In 1971, the microprocessor was invented.
It allowed all the components of a computer to be placed on one minuscule chip. This has
opened the door for the manufacturing and commercialisation of the microcomputer in
1975, followed by the Personal Computer (PC) in 1981. With these developments, com-
puter power became available to the ordinary person and ceased to be the monopoly of
large entities, such as the state or the large business corporation.
According to "Moore's Law," the pace of technological innovation is such that microchip
capacity doubles every eighteen months. Although this rule was first proposed in 1965, it has
only been confirmed in the past three decades. This simply means an exponential increase in
our information processing speed and capacity. It also means smaller and cheaper computers.
In 1960, the average cost of processing information was $75 per million operations. By 1990,
this cost fell to less than one-hundredth of a cent.67 This decline in cost meant decline in the
price of computers making them affordable to the average individual of medium to high
income. In 1977, an executive in the computer industry said: "there is no reason why anyone
would want a computer in their home." Two decades later, around 100 million households
in the United States and Europe have at least one computer at home.6
Transport technologies are another area of technological innovation relevant to the pro-
cess of globalisation. Commercial aviation was introduced in the late 1950s. In 1997, the
number of passengers using domestic and international commercial flights was 1.5 billion
per annum.69 Equally revolutionary developments in the transportation of goods in the
1950s have been directly connected to the increase in international trade in the second half
of the twentieth century.7 0 The introduction of standardised metal containers, which could
be separated from lorry's chassism, loaded onto ships, and later on unloaded onto lorries
at the country of destination, has cut the costs of transportation precipitously. Such devel-
opments in the transportation of goods have made the export of many goods economically
viable when it would not have been with older methods of transportation.
65. UNDP, Human Development Report, at 58 (1999), available athttp://www.undp.org/hdro/report.html.
66. For a brief history of computing, see Jones International Computers: History and Development, in JONES
TELECOMMUNICATIONS & MULTIMEDIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (1999), available at http://www.digitalcentury.com/
encyclo/update/comp hd.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2000).
67. CASTELLS, supra note 61, at 45.
68. UNDP, Human Development Report, Box 2.1, at 58 (1999), available at http://www.undp.org/hdro/
report.html.
69. SCHOLTE, supra note 3, at 76.
70. For an interesting brief account of developments in 'containerisation' and its link to trade, see Delivering
the Goods (Economist, Schools Brief, Nov. 15-21, 1997).
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In summary, each aspect of the process of globalisation can be traced back to some
technological development. Even our capacity to affect the global environment is techno-
logical in nature. This environmentally damaging impact can be traced back to the industrial
revolution, the discovery of fossil energy and its use in large-scale mechanisation.
B. THE ROLE OF LAW AND REGULATION
1. In General
Technology is an indispensable instrument of globalisation. Its globalising potential, how-
ever, is influenced and shaped by laws and regulations. Globalisation, as we understand it
today, is a conscious process. People perceive the world as a single or compressed space.
Laws and regulations enable the technology to achieve its globalising potential and allow
human activity to stretch across borders. Laws and regulations also help create powerful
non-state actors, such as international organisations and corporations, by permitting such
actors to come into being and to acquire their sources of power.
Although one should not exaggerate the autonomy of regulation from technological pres-
sures, history provides many examples of the restrictive impact of regulation on the glob-
alising potential of technology. In the early years of the radio, Marconi Company prohibited
its operators from communicating with other radio operators, thus putting a cap on the
potential of radio as an instrument of instant communication across distance. This prohi-
bition manifest in the Titanic disaster where the absence of standardised radio-operating
procedures deprived the ship from rescue it could have otherwise secured." Another ex-
ample can be found in the area of air transport. In 1944, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt
convened the International Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago with the aim of engen-
dering a freedom of the skies. The Soviet Union decided to withdraw from the conference
at the last moment and denied other countries the right to fly over its territory. It then
created a distinct regulatory system for the Eastern Bloc. This action significantly limited
the global reach of aviation and created barriers between nations that belonged to separate
regulatory arrangements.72
Intellectual property laws provide a more relevant example. By legally creating property
rights to inventions and other intellectual productions, such as computer software, the price
of technology rises to a degree that might be, absent other safeguards, prohibitive to poorer
countries. Globalisation is in essence a technological achievement. Therefore, preventing the
larger part of the world from accessing the technologies that underlie global telecommuni-
cation through fierce application of intellectual property rights will inevitably result in limiting
the reach of telecommunication technologies to a much smaller segment of the globe.7"
But what have laws and regulations actually contributed to bringing about our contem-
porary condition of globalisation? In 1995, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued its
policy paper "Global Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Cooperation," in which it
outlined the regulatory framework necessary to "create a global information network that
transmits messages and images with the speed of light from the largest city to the smallest
village. Through the interconnection of disparate but interoperable networks, these infor-
71. JOHN BRAITrHWAITE & PETER DRAHos, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 328 (2000).
72. Id. at 455.
73. UNDP, Human Development Report, at 69-70 (1999), availabk at http://www.undp.org/hdro/
report.htmi.
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mation highways will allow us to communicate as a global community.. ."4 The regulatory
framework envisioned for the creation of this "global community" is based on global market
access measures including: Standardisation or harmonisation, privatisation, liberalisation,
and deregulation. These four categories provide a reasonable statement of the regulatory
policies that have enabled globalisation in the past three decades.
2. Standardisation and Harmonisation
Legal harmonisation is the convergence between the rules set by different governments.
While standardisation is often used interchangeably with harmonisation, the term actually
has somewhat different meaning in certain contexts. Specifically relevant to this discussion
is the meaning of "standardisation" as a technical form of harmonisation pertaining to the
product specifications. Such specifications may be relevant to the method of production, to
the product's function or to its interoperability with other products."
Harmonisation, in a general sense, plays an important role in the context of intense global
or even merely transnational relations. Governments often resort to harmonisation as a
response to globalisation or transnationalisation and as a way of dealing with the problems
that such cross border relations may impose. Harmonisation of money laundering laws and
regulations is an example of the use of harmonisation to counter the problems of global-
isation. Harmonisation has, however, been instrumental in bringing about globalisation.
Telecommunication as the primary instrument of globalisation would not be possible with-
out standardisation.7 6 Any form of communication, for example language, assumes agree-
ment on the symbols and the codes of this communication. In the early years of the tele-
graph, each state unilaterally set its own standards. This resulted in significant impediments
to cross-border communication. In some instances, it was necessary for the telegraph op-
erator to physically cross the border in order to hand a message to his counterpart on the
other side." Exasperation with this type of problem and the international community's
desire for a more efficient cross-border communication led to convening the International
Telecommunication Conference in 1865. This conference carried out the first standardi-
sation effort by designating Morse code as the preferred code for the telegram. 8 The
Conference also established the International Telegraph Union (ITU) in 1865 as one of
the first two international organisations19 for the purpose of providing a forum within which
74. U.S. Department of Commerce, Global Information Infrastructure (GII): Agenda for Cooperation, at
26, available at http://www.iitef.nist.gov/documents/docs/gii/giiagend.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2001).
75. BRArrHwArrE & DI)mos, supra note 71, at 332; RegulatoryReformandInternationalStandardisation,Work-
ing Party of the Trade Committee, 9j 19-2 1, OECD Doe. TD/TC/WP(98)36/FINAL (1998).
76. The U.S. Government in its policy document on the implementation of the GII stated that:
An essential technical element.., is interoperability, i.e., the ability to connect applications, services,
and/or network components so that they can be used together to accomplish tasks. As the GII will be
based on many different existing and emerging components at local, national and global levels, it is
imperative that these components be interoperable. The key to interoperability is the development of
global standards.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Global Information Infrastructure (GBl): Agenda for Cooperation, at 12
(1995), available at http://www.iitf.nist.goc/documents/docs/gii/giiagend.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2001).
77. Bn.rTawmTrr & DRAlos, supra note 71, at 332.
78. George A. Codding, The International Telecommunications Union: 130 Years of Telecommunications Regu-
lation, 23 DENv.J. IN-T'L L. & PoL'v 501-11 (1995).
79. The other one is The Universal Postal Union.
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countries can develop and co-ordinate the telegraph standards and procedures in order to
achieve interoperability.
During its 135 years of history, ITU has expanded its jurisdiction to new technologies.
It brought long distance telephony under its auspices in 1925 and radiotelegraphy in 1927.
In 1934, ITU evolved into the International Telecommunication Union, with the French
providing telecommunication as an alternative and more generic term that encompasses
the widening scope of technologies that the Union co-ordinates and regulates.80 In the
1970s, this scope further expanded to include satellite communication.8
The ITU performs its standardisation functions through a complex web of international
telecommunication standardisation conferences, study and expert groups, committees, and
scientific organisations. The increasing complexity of the telecommunication regulations
drafted by the technical committees forced states in 1973 to delegate their sovereignty. The
states granted the Telegraph and Telephone regulations direct enforceability by national
administrations or private operating agencies without further requiring the official endorse-
ment of governments in an international conference.2 The standardisation operations by
ITU filled thousands of pages and covered an extensive array of topics bearing both on the
product specifications of telecommunication technology and on its performance with inter-
operability as the paramount objective."'
Standardisation helps globalisation in yet another way. By standardising product speci-
fications, performance, and method of production, goods could be traded more liberally
between different countries and production processes could be integrated across national
borders; thus, facilitating the globalisation of two important economic activities, namely
trade and production. Removing technical barriers to trade through standardisation was
the rationale behind establishing the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)
in 1947. The ISO is a non-governmental organisation that has as its mission the promotion
of "the development of standardization and related activities in the world with a view to
facilitating the international exchange of goods and services.. .",4 The ISO standardisation
activities cover a very broad range of products from telephone and bank cards to paper sizes
and wire ropes.
The ISO's achievement in the standardisation of freight containers serves as a good example
of the significance of standardisation in facilitating cross-border trade. By standardising the
sizes of containers and the lorry's chassis that carried them, goods could be containerised,
loaded on the compatible lorries, transported to harbours, then unloaded onto ships in an
efficient manner and transported across long distances by sea. Upon arriving to their
destination, lorries of the same standardised chassis size would carry them to their ultimate
warehouses and finally to their retailers. Standardisation of containers and its associated tech-
nologies has had enormous consequences for the efficiency and cost effectiveness of
80. For a brief history of ITU, see Codding, supra note 78, at 502.
81. BRArrHWAUTE & DRAmos, supra note 71, at 329-32.
82. Id. at 327.
83. Article 1.3 of the International Telecommunication Regulations provides that: "These Regulations are
established with a view to facilitating global interconnection and interoperability of telecommunication..."
International Telecommunication Regulation (1988), available at http://www.wia.org/dns-law/pub/ITU_
TelecomRegs.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2000).
84. International Organisation for Standardisation, Introduction to ISO, available at http://www.iso.ch/
infoe/intro.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2000).
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international trade, increasing significantly its volume, and thus, enabling its globalisation.85
Following the significant reduction of tariff barriers to trade through the operation of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade since 1947, the "technical barriers to trade
became more evident." In 1994, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)86
was passed as one of the twenty-nine legal texts of the VTO Agreement. The TBT Agree-
ment's purpose is to ensure that VTO Members who ratify it are committed to using
international standards where such standards exist or are imminent. Parties also must com-
mit to reducing the hindering effect that technical regulations and conformity assessment
procedures might have on international trade. Growing consciousness of the effect that
disparities in technical regulations might have on the flow of international trade underlie
incorporating TBT as a standardisation mechanism within the WTO system.87
So far this discussion focused on stAndardisation in the narrow technical sense that in-
troduced it. Legal harmonisation, in the broader sense, including the harmonisation of
substantive legal principles, such as contract and property principles, is however part and
parcel of the globalisation process. Every geographic expansion of social relations carries
with it geographic spread of legal ideas and principles. The early military expansion of the
Roman Empire between 27 B.c. and 284 A.D. carried with it the parallel expansion of Private
Roman law.88 The rise of trade in medieval Europe across its various cities and communities
led to the emergence of Lex Mercatoria as a harmonised set of legal principles governing
merchants in their trade.9 Globalisation since the 1960s has resulted in extensive harmo-
nisation efforts, on aspects of which this study will elaborate. Harmonisation of substantive
legal principles underlying business transactions undoubtedly facilitates the cross-border
operation of such transactions. It is not, however, readily accepted that this type of har-
monisation is a necessary infrastructure or instrument of globalisation.90 This debate re-
mains beyond the scope of this article.
In conclusion, harmonisation in general, and standardisation in a more specific technical
sense are regulatory mechanisms necessary for globalisation, as we understand it today to
take place. Without technical interoperability, telecommunication systems would not be
able to perform their function in bringing a distant locality to the instantaneous proximity
that we presently experience. Technical standardisation also facilitates integrating markets
and production and increases the volume of world trade. While substantive legal harmoni-
sation is not necessarily a globalising instrument, enthusiastic efforts, aided by the rapid
technological circulation of information, are expended around the world towards this cause.
3. Privatisation
As explained in the definition of globalisation adopted above, it is a process of change
that is both geographic and political. While standardisation is primarily an instrument for
85. THINKING ABoUT GLOBALIZATION: POPULAR MYTHS AND ECONOMIC FACTS, (1997), available at http://
www.economist.com/bookshop/schools/schoolsbrief.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2000).
86. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (1994), available at http://www.wto.org. (last visited Oct. 3,
2000).
87. International Organisation for Standardisation, Standards and World Trade, availableat http://www.iso.ch/
wtotbt.hon (last visited Dec. 30, 2000).
88. BRATHWAITE & DRAos, supra note 71, at 40-41.
89. Id. at 45-47.
90. On the rejection of the proposition that substantive harmonization is a necessity for globalization, see,
e.g., Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and its Effects on Developing Economies, G-24 Discussion Paper
Series, No. 4, (U.N. Center for International Development Harvard University 2000).
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the geographic aspect of globalisation, privatisation is an instrument for its two facets; i.e.,
geographic compression and political power shifts.
Privatisation is a broad and diverse concept.91 Discussions of privatisation often represent
it as the transfer of ownership from the government to the private sector. An example of
this approach is found in a World Bank publication that defines privatisation as "the transfer
of ownership of SOEs [State-Owned Enterprises] to the private sector by the sale-full or
partial-of ongoing concerns or by the sale of assets following liquidation." 9 Other com-
mentators, however, perceive privatisation more in terms of its impact on the governance
structure in the society. In this sense, privatisation is discussed as redistribution of gover-
nance roles in favour of the private sector. It is thus defined broadly as "the shifting of a
function, either in whole or in part, from the public sector to the private sector . . . 9
Without undermining the significance of the transfer of ownership in privatisation, priv-
atisation remains essentially a transfer of roles and functions from the state to the private
sector. This often involves transfer of property rights from the public to the private sector
or creation of new private rights.
The current privatisation movement started in the United Kingdom, which pioneered it
in the early 1980s, shortly after the ascent of the Conservative Party to power in 1979.94
This trend has followed more than three decades of nationalisation policies, and continuous
expansion of the public sector, which has witnessed a pervasive direct intervention of the
state as a producer and a service provider in various economic sectors. In sectors such as
public utilities, including gas, electricity, telecommunication, water, and sometimes trans-
portation, this intervention was justified on the basis of the goal of universal service. Public
utilities were perceived as essential and a belief developed that every citizen was entitled to
these basic services. Government's direct intervention in providing health services and edu-
cation was founded on similar perceptions of entitlement and that it was the government's
responsibility to guarantee universal access. In other areas such as mining and shipbuilding,
government intervention was justified on the basis of the strategic significance of such
industries for national security.9
In November 1984, the Conservative Government in the United Kingdom under the
leadership of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher privatised British Telecom. Commentators
marked this privatisation as the watershed in the privatisation policy, which established it
as a programme and as a resilient trend.96 The trend soon spread to other countries at
various stages of development. In 1985, U.S. Secretary of Treasury James Baker brought
privatisation to the international sphere in his address to the Bank/Fund Annual Meetings
in SeoulY Ever since, privatisation has become a policy item on the agendas of the U.S.
91. For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in the definition and the various approaches, see HARvEY
FEIGENBAUM ET AL., SHRINKING THE STATE: THE POLITICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF PRIVATIZATION 5-12 (1999).
92. SuNITA KIKER! ET AL., PRIVATIZATIONS: THE LESSONS OF EXPEIENCE 14 (1992).
93. FEIGENBAUM, supra note 91, at 1.
94. On the U.K. experience, see OLIVER LETWiN, PRIVATISING THE WORLD: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL
PRIVATISATION IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE (1988); see also CENTo VEIJANOVSKI, SELLING THE STATE: PRI-
VATISATION IN BRITAIN (1987); see also Cosmo Graham, Privatisation-the UnitedKingdom Experience, in NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON LAw AND PRIVATISATION 17-39 (F. McEldowney ed., 1999).
95. VEIjANovsi, supra note 94, at 54-57.
96. LETWIN, supra note 94, at 12.
97. John Williamson, What should the Bank Think About the Washington Consensus? (Institute for International
Economics, 1997), available at http://www.iie.con/TESTMONY/Bankwc.htn (last visited Jan. 21, 2001).
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Agency for International Development (USAID), the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (World Bank), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is
under the influence, and sometimes the pressure, of such institutions that the phenomenon
of privatisation is constantly spreading into growing numbers of developing countries.
The trend towards privatisation acquired more significance when it began to infiltrate
the thinking of governments with command economies in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Un-
ion, and China. Henceforth, those governments have directly commanded up to 90 percent
of all productive economic activities mostly through "state owned enterprises."98 With the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the disintegration of the Socialist Bloc, a massive
programme of wholesale privatisation started. To get a sense of the size of this process, it
is enough to note that in the early 1990s, the former German Democratic Republic pri-
vatised more enterprises over a period of eighteen months than the rest of the world did
over a period of fifteen years. 99 It is also important to note that in the former socialist
countries, privatisation did not only mean transfer of roles and ownership from the public
to the private sector, it effectively meant creating the notion of private property from
scratch. This fact makes privatisation in the ex-command economies not only quantitatively
more significant, but rather qualitatively so.
Although privatisation is initially a political decision, turning the policy into practice
cannot take place without extensive lawmaking. The intervention of the legislature varies
amongst countries depending on their basic laws and constitutional principles. In the ex-
treme case of the former planned economies, implementing privatisation policies required
overhauling the legal system, introducing new constitutions and civil codes that implement
afresh the concepts of private property and regulate it. In other countries, such as Germany,
less extensive constitutional changes were required in order to allow the privatisation of
certain sectors. The majority of academic opinion perceived telecommunications and postal
services to be exclusively a federal function under article 87(1) of the Basic Law before its
amendment. Therefore, preparing these services for privatisation has required amending
the Basic Law to allow private providers to provide these services.100
Brazil is also a case in point. It needed radical constitutional change in order to terminate
the dominance of the public sector in the economy. Under the twenty years of military rule
(1964-1984) the public sector represented approximately 70 percent of the country's gross
national product. The Latin-American liquidity crisis in the early 1980s limited Brazil's
access to capital and rendered such interventionist economic policies not viable. This eco-
nomic condition triggered a policy shift towards privatisation. In order to put this and other
policy shifts into effect, Brazil introduced a new constitution in 1988. Article 173 limited
the State's direct participation in the economy to cases of national security, significant public
interest, and a number of other constitutionally prescribed exceptions. The list of exceptions
was however too large, including telecommunications, electricity, gas, transportation, min-
ing, the post, and the telegraph. As a result, further legal intervention continued to be
necessary in order to implement more rigorous privatisation.' 0'
98. KiKERU, supra note 92, at 73.
99. Id. at 74.
100. Sven Reckewerth, ConstitutionalImitations on Privatisation in Germany, in NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND PRIVATISATION 131-144 (F. McEldowney ed., 1999).
101. Durval De Noronha Goyos & Eliana Maria Filippozzi, The Brazilian Constitutional Review and the
Privatisation Programme-An Overview, 5:7 INT'L CoMPANY CoaM. L. REv. 243 (1994).
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Because of the absence of a written constitution and the principle of parliamentary sov-
ereignty, which grants the Parliament under the English Constitution the right "to make
or unmake any law whatever,"102 the privatisation programme in the United Kingdom faced
much less legal constraints than in other countries. Nevertheless, in each case of privat-
isation, legal intervention remained necessary to repeal the earlier nationalisation acts and
to pave the way for the privatisation of the service or the industry. However, France applied
a different legal solution. In July 1986, a general enabling law was introduced delegating
the power to the government to privatise a list of enterprises without further recourse to
the Parliament for legislation.10°
The role of law in the privatisation process is very extensive. It is not merely confined
to establishing the principle of privatisation in the constitution or the basic law. Very com-
plex legal issues arise in any privatisation process; for example: the transfer of rights and
liabilities from the national body to the new entity, the rights of third parties, the transfer
of employees, their rights and legal status, to whom is the ownership to be transferred, and
the extent of foreign capital control of the privatised entity.104 Several policy issues arise in
this context and the law is invariably used to reflect the government's policy stances whether
liberal, interventionist, welfare-oriented, or market-oriented. The potency of privatisation
as a globalisation instrument depends largely on such policy options and the laws imple-
menting them.
The U.S. Department of Commerce 1995 prescription on the requirements necessary
for a "global information network" lists privatisation as a measure necessary for global
market access.105 This categorisation summarises the ways in which privatisation acts as an
instrument for globalisation in the geographic sense. Direct government involvement in
the production of goods or supply of services often results in state monopoly and protec-
tionist measures that exclude foreign investment in the concerned sector. Privatisation, on
the other hand, is often a first and necessary step towards the market liberalisation and
opening it for foreign investment. Considering the scope of the present privatisation move-
ment, sectors that were originally considered too strategic and too sensitive in terms of
public interest value, such as telecommunications and other utilities, are now frequently
taken over by foreign investors. The sensitivity of the sectors that are now open to foreign
investment and sometimes control, render global interdependence and inter-entanglement
more acute.
Ownership is power. Privatisation, as has once been indicated, represents "the largest
transfer of property since the dissolution of the monasteries under Henry VIII."106 It, there-
fore, represents a massive transfer of power. Power shifts that are inherent in privatisation
are central to the definition of globalisation presented above and to the argument of this
work. Privatisation reorganises governance structures and institutions in the society. It re-
moves the utility or the strategic sector from the direct control of government and places
102. A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (10th ed.) 39-40, cited in NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PER-
sPEcTIV'ES ON LAW AND PRIVATISATION, supra note 94, at 17.
103. LETWIN, supra note 94, at 15.
104. Jane Richardson, Translating Policy into Law-The Role of the Legal Adviser, in NATIONAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON LAw AND PRIVATISATION 42-44 (F. McEldowney ed., 1999).
105. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Global Information Infrastructure (GII): Agenda for Cooperation,
supra note 74.
106. MADSEN PIRIE, PRIVATIZATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 21 (1985), cited in VEIjANOVSxI, supra note 94,
at 1.
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it under private control. From this point onward, the government would not be able to
implement any public policy relating to the sector privatised without entering into nego-
tiations with the newly created private power.107
Privatisation also creates new classes of interests.I°8 When British Telecom was privatised
in 1984, 2.3 million individuals bought shares. 10 Privatisation through public offering typi-
cally broadens the base of ownership and popularises the equity market. This results in cre-
ating a new class of interests that is capable of developing and exercising its own bargaining
power. After an extensive programme of privatisation, such classes form another interest group
with whom the government must negotiate in the development and implementation of public
policy. The separation between the government and the supply of goods and services through
privatisation has also rendered transparent economic sectors that were previously shrouded
in secrecy. This access to information was a by-product of privatisation that empowered the
new classes of interest and enhanced their leverage in negotiations over public policy issues.
It also empowered old interest groups such as the consumers, which were almost helpless
under the opaque system of supply of goods and services in the era of nationalisation." 0
The potency of privatisation as a globalisation instrument is contingent on the employed
mechanisms of privatisation and on post-privatisation regulation. Government can use the
law to restrict foreign investment, for example by requiring a controlling share of local capital
in the privatised utility in order to prevent foreign control. This clearly undercuts the pos-
sibilities of geographic globalisation inherent in the process. Furthermore, the capacity of
privatisation to shift the power arrangements in the society is contingent on the mechanisms
of privatisation and how far it removes government control over the economy. II
If government adopts a highly interventionist regulatory policy vis-a-vis the privatised
industry or utility, regulation can act as a substitute for direct ownership in securing gov-
ernment control over the sector. This capacity, however, should not be exaggerated. Gov-
ernment intervention through regulation remains checked by the private sector control
over the sources of financing. This power becomes even more commanding in the current
context of globalised capital markets, where capital can move freely and choose the forum
that is most suitable to its interests. No matter how reserved the privatisation is, changes
in the governance structure and the place of government within it invariably takes place.
Post-privatisation governance is always more diffused and decentralised.
4. Deregulation and Liberalisation
As the previous section explains, the capacity of privatisation as an instrument of glob-
alisation is contingent on the degree and type of regulation imposed on the privatised sector.
Regulation is a substitute for government direct supply of goods and services. It means
control exercised by the state, through legislation and other government instruments, over
the activities of legitimate private economic entities. 112 Albeit simplistic, one can distinguish
107. On the political significance of privatisation, see, e.g., FEIGENBAUM, supra note 91.
108. Id. at 56.
109. LETWIN, supra note 94, at 12.
110. John McEldowney, Law and Regulation: Current Issues and Future Directions, in THE REGULATORY CH-IAL-
LENGE 408, 413 (Matthew Bishop et al. eds., 1995).
11I. This point is made repeatedly and poignantly in FEIGENBAUM, supra note 91. The authors clearly dis-
tinguish between privatisation and "shrinking the state," which they define as "reducing the overall level of
state intervention in the society rather than simply reducing the size of the public sector."
112. On the definition of regulation, see Giandomenico Majone, Introduction, DEREGULATION AND RE-
REGULATION
? 
REGULATORY REFORM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (Giandomenico Majone ed., 1990);
see also Ross Cranston, Regulation and Deregulation: General Issues, 5:2 UNIv. S. WALES LJ. 1, 2 (1982).
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between two types of regulation: economic regulation and social regulation. Economic
regulation includes government regulatory control over economic decisions such as pricing
and profit structure, output, market entry and exit. Social regulation, on the other hand,
refers to government intervention, which aims at advancing special interests such as con-
sumer protection, environmental protection, and health and safety considerations." 3
A regulatory reform movement started in the middle of the 1970s, guided by the same
goal that triggered and directed the privatisation movement of the same period, namely the
desire to roll back the state and reduce public sector intervention in the economy. This
movement, unlike privatisation, started in the United States. The reason for this is very
simple. The United States has always had a dominant private sector and a minimal state
involvement in the direct supply of goods and services. When virtually the rest of the world
engaged in massive nationalisation programmes after the Second World War, the United
States remained the exception. Instead, the United States relied on strict and interventionist
regulatory policies implemented through independent technocratic regulatory agencies in
order to implement the state's social and economic plans. When the tide of public sector
expansion ebbed, other countries led by the United Kingdom launched extensive pri-
vatisation programmes as previously described. The United States, on the other hand, had
little to privatise and a lot of regulatory structures to dismantle. This regulatory reform
movement has thus been termed "deregulation."
Deregulation, inasmuch as it implies the end of all regulations, is misleading. During the
past three decades one can easily detect a proliferation of state regulatory intervention in
areas such as health and safety, environmental protection, and consumer protection. In other
words, during the same period of deregulatory reform, one can easily see proliferation of
social regulation. Deregulatory pressures are, however, to be witnessed in the area of eco-
nomic regulation. These pressures and the broader movement towards reducing the size
and role of the state are the product of a growing belief in the market as a superior mech-
anism of resource allocation and disillusionment with the state as a disinterested technocrat
capable of allocating resources objectively and rationally. 14 Accordingly, this has led econ-
omists and policy makers to leave more decisions to the market and to reduce the number
of justifications for state intervention to correct market failures. In the area of social regu-
lation where the state is increasingly active, the voices for the supremacy or even the capacity
of the market to serve the social interest remain less convincing.
A survey of deregulation in various sectors of the U.S. economy serves to illustrate the
trend's direction. In 1978, deregulation of air transport was finally effectuated through
legislation. This involved totally dismantling the economic regulatory structure; i.e., price-
and-entry regulation, while leaving safety regulations in place. During the same period,
deregulation of the truck industry took place, relaxing the rules on new entry and allowing
individual truckers to set their own prices. Similar reforms were implemented in the railway
sector, where in 1980 railway companies were allowed to abandon unprofitable lines more
easily and to set their prices more freely."5
113. TONY PROSSER, LAW AND REGULATORS 10-15 (1997); Cranston, supra note 112, at 2.
114. For a brief discussion of the theoretical foundations of deregulation and their impact on regulatory
policy in the United States, see David Linowes, Privatization and Deregulation in the United States, in PRIVAT-
IZATION AND DEREGULATION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 80-96 (Dennis Gayle & Jonathan Goodrich eds., 1990).
115. Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Deregulation in the United States: Airlines, Tekcommunications andAnti-
trust, in DEREGULATION AND RE-REGULATION? REGULATORY REFORM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 8,
15-16 (Giandomenico Majone ed., 1990).
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Deregulation as "substituting market mechanisms for administrative coordination"' 16 is
clearly a globalisation instrument as it is understood in this article. The more decisions left
to the market, the more decentralised the structure of governance, i.e., the more acute
globalisation is as a process of political reorganisation. The record of deregulation, however,
remains ambivalent. With deregulatory pressures dismantling state economic intervention
in certain areas, contradictory regulatory pressures are inviting state control over the eco-
nomic decisions of private entities in others. Taking the concern for energy supply, which
was triggered by the Californian energy crisis in 2000 as an example, one can clearly see a
relapse towards more government intervention in the power generation market. Shortly
after the re-election of the Labour Party to government in the United Kingdom in June
2001, a report of the Better Regulation Task Force was published. The Report concluded
that the U.K. market was in many respects over regulated and recommended a series of
deregulatory measures. At the same time, concern over energy supplies has resulted in
declaring a policy of more regulation of the electricity generation market. On these bases,
one can only conclude that while the trend towards price-and-entry deregulation is defi-
nitely a globalising trend in the political sense, its depth and linearity are not conclusive.
Reversals in its progress contribute to the ambivalence and dialectic nature of political
arrangements during the currant process of globalisation.
Liberalisation is a type of deregulation that has particular bearing on the process of
globalisation. In reversing the protectionist trends of the 1930s, liberalisation formed the
starting point for all international economic policy discussion since the Second World
War.1"7 Liberalisation means allowing the unrestricted flow of goods and services across
borders."8 In implementation, this meant removing or reducing nationalistic economic
regulations aimed at restricting the access of foreign goods and services to national markets.
Import tariffs and quotas are the obvious example of such restrictive measures. Early lib-
eralisation efforts have thus focused on reducing the amount of tariffs imposed on imports.
This was done through a complex process of bilateral and multilateral negotiations of tariff
concessions resulting in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)"9 in 1948
as a multilateral agreement for the mutual reduction of tariffs. This initial round of multi-
lateral negotiations was followed by seven other rounds. The most successful was the Uru-
guay Round, which concluded in 1994 and resulted in the establishment of the World
116. Philippe Koebel, Dereg8uation of the Telecommunication Sector: A movement in line with Recent Technological
Advances, in DEREGULATION OR RE-REGULATION? REGULATORY REFORM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 110,
115 (Giandomenico Majone ed., 1990).
117. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAw AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELAIONS 11-14 (1997).
118. For a discussion of different definitions of liberalisation, see David M. Driesen, What is Free Trade?:
The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade and Environment Debate, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 279 (2001). In this article
the author argues that there is ambiguity in the definition of "free trade." He organises his discussion around
the question of "what precisely must trade be free of in order to be free ...?" Id. at 280. He then proposes
that free trade in policy discussions and in the law of the WTO and the jurisprudence of the Dispute Settlement
Body is used in three different meanings: free trade as (1) trade free of discrimination between foreign and
domestically produced goods; (2) trade free of attempts to coerce non-complying countries to implement certain
non-trade law standards such as environmental law; or (3) as trade free of national regulation under broad
laissez-faire conception.
119. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I 1, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
194, available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter GATTI].
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Trade Organisation (WTO) and the r~duction of tariffs on non-primary products to 3.9
percent in industrialised countries 20 and to 12.3 percent in developing countries.'
Barriers to trade are not always so straightforward. Following the impressive success of
trade negotiation rounds in reducing tariffs on non-primary products to near negligible
levels, attention has shifted to non-tariff barriers to trade (NTB). The first five rounds of
trade negotiations were almost entirely dedicated to negotiating tariff concessions. Nego-
tiating NTBs first appeared on the agenda as a primary goal of negotiations in the sixth
round: the Kennedy Round (1962-1967). This focus on NTBs persisted in the last two
rounds of trade negotiations, the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) and the Uruguay Round
(1986-1994).' 22 Non-tariff protectionist measures are only restricted by the imagination of
governments. All attempts at cataloguing these various measures have resulted in volumi-
nous but incomprehensive records. 1," Examples of NTBs include imposing a requirement
to place imported cattle in quarantine without providing quarantine facilities,2 4 or an im-
porting nation requiring a product inspection to be conducted by its own authorities and
does not send an inspector to implement the requirement. '25
Determining what constitutes non-tariff barrier to trade could be very problematic.
While the protectionist character of these amusing examples is very evident, other cases
could be much more complex. In a highly integrated world, any national regulation could
constitute a burden on cross-border trade. Regulations that aim at advancing other social
interests, such as the protection of the environment or the health and safety of consumers,
could be perceived as creating a barrier to trade, especially where the obligations imposed
are more onerous on foreign producers. Determining whether the measure constitutes a
trade barrier or not hinges on questions, such as whether the measure is necessary for
advancing the perceived interest.'2 6 In this context, liberalisation policies could create de-
regulatory pressures in a wider sense.
The Uruguay Round expanded the liberalisation agenda to a wider range of areas such
as services, textiles, and agriculture. While the progress achieved by the Uruguay Round
in liberalising services was impressive, liberalisation in agriculture and textiles remains lim-
ited. This again confirms the dialectic nature of globalisation. Liberalisation, like deregu-
lation, is not linear or conclusive. Protectionist and restrictive measures persist despite the
economic assumption in favour of liberalisation.
As it becomes apparent, while information and communication technologies are determin-
ing factors in the process of globalisation, globalisation remains to a certain degree a legal or
regulatory product. Globalisation involved major technological leaps, as well as drastic reg-
ulatory activities including harmonisation and standardisation of laws, privatisation of gov-
ernment property and functions and deregulation especially in its liberalising aspect.
120. JACKSoN, supra note 117, at 74.
121. Kristina Kloiber, Removing Technical Barriers to Trade: The Next Step Toward Freer Trade, 9 TUL. J. INT'L
ComP. L. 511, 512 (2001).
122. JAcKsoN, supra note 117, at 73-74.
123. In 1973, the GATT produced a catalogue of NTBs of all participating countries that included over
800 such barriers. In 1986, UNCTAD in a similar project had on her country-by-country lists many more
than the GATT's 800 non-tariff barriers. See id. at 154.
124. Kloiber, supra note 121, at 513.
125. JAcKSON, supra note 117, at 155.
126. For a critical discussion of the role of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body in making such determi-
nation, see Driesen, supra note 118.
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IV. The Timeframe (When Did Globalisation Begin?)
This is one of the main questions in the globalisation debate. The varying views on this
question offer three possibilities:127 (1) that globalisation is as old as history, dating back at
least to the beginnings of Christianity as a world religion; (2) globalisation is a contemporary
phenomenon that started with the beginnings of modernity and capitalism;28 or (3) that
globalisation is much more recent and is a product or a symptom of the post-modem and
post-industrial information society. 129
Despite the seemingly stark difference between these views, they all agree that recently
there has been a sudden acceleration in the process. In other words, the question is not
whether we are undergoing change at this particular stage of history. It is rather how deep
and how novel is this change. The debate can thus be reduced to a question of degree.
Exploring the parameters of this debate and engaging in it is beyond the scope of this
article. The article simply relies on this element of agreement on globalisation acceleration
witnessed in the past three decades; globalisation is a recent phenomenon that started in
the beginnings of the 1970s. The basis of this position is found by analysing how global-
isation came about.
Globalisation is a product of technological and regulatory change. Its history is thus indis-
tinguishable from their history. While telecommunication dates back to late nineteenth cen-
tury, the intensity, "instantaneousness,"' 30 and spread of present modes of communication, as
well as their cheap costs is incomparable to the developments of that "remote" past. The
present telecommunication revolution could not have been possible without the invention of
the Integrated Circuit in 1958 and the Microprocessor in 1971. These technological devel-
opments made our present reality of intense, instantaneous, global communication possible.
The history of globalising legal change is equally recent. While standardisation is as old
as cross-border technologies, such as the telephone and the train, its momentum has picked
up with the shifting emphasis on non-tariff barriers to trade since the Tokyo Round (1973-
79). Further, the privatisation of British Telecom in 1984 marks the beginning of the pri-
vatisation movement in the pioneering United Kingdom as well as worldwide. The parallel
movement towards deregulation dates back to the mid-1970s in the United States.
This rough calendar of globalising legal and technological development shows that glob-
alisation as a process of social change could be situated temporally in the last three decades
of the twentieth century to the present. While the process does have some roots and genesis
since the late nineteenth century, its legal and technological forces did not gather their
collective momentum until the beginning of the 1970s. This process has also reached a new
height with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent disintegration of
the Soviet Bloc. This conclusion, therefore, delineates the historical scope of this work and
forms part of the basis for its core thesis.
V. Globalisation as a Legal Problem
The debate about globalisation and the law falls within a broader debate in globalisation
studies concerning the problem of governance. In fact, this concern forms one of the core
127. WAERS, supra note 7, at 4; SCHOLTE, supra note 3, at 62.
128. One of the main proponents of this view is GIDDENS, supra note 7, at 21.
129. For attempts at periodising globalisation, see SCHOLTE, supra note 3, at 62-88; ROBERTSON, supra note
5, at 57-60.
130. The present author attaches great importance to this instantaneous character of current modes of
communication. In her view, this is the sine qua non condition for the emergence of de-territorial social life.
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aspects of problematising globalisation.'3' Posed as a question, globalisation theorists have
repeatedly asked: (1) What are the implications of globalising economic activities and or-
ganisations for the Westphalian structure of governance? and (2) How can we control,
regulate or organise these emergent "deterritorial" aspects of social life? Such questions
echoed in the writings of political economists, social scientists, and inevitably lawyers. This
part of the article focuses on the latter's approach.
The complexity of the globalisation concept did not escape lawyers. One author indicated
that globalisation is a "multifaceted concept encompassing a wide range of seemingly dis-
parate processes, activities and conditions-some nebulous, others concrete-that often re-
inforce as well as clash with each other."132 Lawyers, however, while acknowledging this
complexity did not engage intensely in the debate about definition. They did not strain
themselves to distinguish globalisation from other similar phenomenon such as transna-
tionalisation, or internationalisation. They often used globalisation interchangeably with
some of the others.)3 In analysing legal writing on globalisation one can encounter three
approaches to defining the concept: (1) some authors omit totally any attempt at definition
and use the concept instead as self-explanatory, 34 (2) others list a set of examples of what
is perceived as globalisation symptoms and label it as such, 33 and (3) others actually tackle
the question of definition and adopt one definition or another. In all these cases, the student
can clearly see the lawyer's disinterest in this definitional problem and the eagerness to
move on to the more practical issues involved.
Nevertheless, in studying the lawyers' globalisation definitions, one can discern the sim-
ilarities with other social scientific analysis as well as certain disciplinary characteristics.
Lawyers, like others, perceive globalisation as change in the social surrounding that merits
their attention. The geographic nature of this change is repeatedly expressed in their writ-
ing. According to one author, the disparate processes of globalisation are connected by a
single theme, which is "What is geographically meaningful now transcends national bound-
aries and is expanding to cover the entire planet?" 36
There are also various characteristic features about the lawyer's understanding of glob-
alisation. These characteristics can all be traced to the particular understanding of territory
in the discipline of law. For lawyers, geographic spheres and territories are descriptions of
legal spheres of competence or dominion. 37 In that sense, when lawyers talk about glob-
alisation as a geographical change, they are also implicitly referring to globalisation as a
political shift in power and authority. In a legal sense, territory is a "sphere of legal com-
petence"'131 and deterritorialisation is a loss of such competence. This explains why lawyers
are more explicitly conscious of globalisation as an omission of the state. Lawyers frequently
use the word "denationalisation" to define globalisation. This is often combined with in-
131. SCHOLTE, supra note 3, at 132-158.
132. Alex Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, CORNELL INT'L LJ. 429 (1997).
133. See, e.g., Harald Baum, Globalizing Capital Markets and Possible Regulatory Responses, in LEGAL ASPECTS
OF GLOBALIZATION: CONFLICTS OF LAws, INTERNET, CAPITAL MARKETS AND INSOLVENCY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
77-132 (urgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono eds., 1999).
134. See, e.g., David M. Engel, Transfirmnations of Law and Place: Introduction to the Articles by Buchanan,
Dariah-Smith, Maurer, and Aman, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 363 (1995).
135. John Jackson, Global Economics and International Economic Law, 1 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 1 (1998).
136. Seita, supra note 132, at 429.
137. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 114 (5th ed. 1998).
138. Id.
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corporating the governance problem in their definition. For example, one author discussing
the status of non-governmental organisations under international law defines globalisation
as: "denationalization of clusters of political, economic, and social activities that undermine
the ability of the sovereign State to control activities on its territory."' 13 9
Legal writing about globalisation is organised around the loss of state power problem
and the mismatch between the state's legal competence and the geographic scope of certain
activities and/or problems. Lawyers tend to either advocate solutions to this problem or
critique emerging solutions. The latter spurs a whole set of new problems that are essentially
side effects of the attempts at solving the legal governance problem. This section will start
by elaborating on the core problem of territorial governance versus social and economic
de-territoriality, followed by discussing the various emerging solutions to this core problem.
The section concludes by discussing the problematic implications of such solutions for
democracy, legitimacy, and state sovereignty.
A. TERRITORIALITY V. DE-TERRITORIALITY: A CORE PROBLEMATIC
As previously indicated, the problem of the mismatch between the scope of state gov-
ernance and the scope of social activities is the core legal problem posed by globalisation.
This problem is captured in the titles of writings addressing the issues such as: "Interna-
tional Business and National Jurisdiction,"' 4° "On governing a Permeable Society,"' 4' and
"Global Economics and International Economic Law."'142 Authors repeatedly pose questions
such as: Just where is the market when it exists in the computer system? Who regulates a
market when its geographical coordinates can no longer be pinned down easily? Which
jurisdiction or jurisdictions are supposed to regulate a given conduct in connection with a
cross-border securities transaction? They gravely formulate the problem in statements such
as: "[T]here is a serious disconnect between the scope of economic processes and the reach
of rules to govern those processes... ,',14 and "Individuals had become global actors, yet
the frameworks establishing rules, rights, and duties remained tied to a territory."' 44
This section will explain the prevalent territoriality of the Westphalian legal order. This
will follow with a description of the current de-territorialisation of economic and social
activities. The last part will discuss a schematic analysis of the problems that this contrast
poses for legal governance.
1. Territoriality and the Law
The organisation of the world into geographic entities called "states" dates back to the
Peace of Westphalia in 1648. These Peace Treaties divided Europe into independent ter-
ritorial units, thus creating the notion of "state" as we understand it today.'4 The statehood
139. Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-Governmental Organizations Under
International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 579, 586 (1999).
140. A. D. NEALE & M. L. STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL BUsINEss AND NATIONAL JURISDICTION (1988).
141. JARROD WIENER, GLOBALIZATION AND THE HARMONIZATION OF LAw 3 (1999). The title referred to in
the text is the heading of the introduction to the book.
142. Jackson, supra note 135.
143. Theodore Posner & Timothy Reif, Homage to a Bull Moose: Applying Lessons of History to Meet the
Challenges of Globalization, 24 FoRnaom INT'L LJ. 481, 490 (2000).
144. WIENER, supra note 141, at vii.
145. Malcolm N. Shaw, Territory in International Law, 13 NETHERLANDS Y.B. INT'L L. 62 (1982).
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criteria formulated in Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States define a state as a political community that possesses a defined territory
and a permanent population and is subject to an organised form of government. 146
This definition makes it apparent that territoriality is a constitutive element of the state.
The significance of this element has been repeatedly pronounced by scholars of interna-
tional law. According to Oppenheim, "a State without a territory is not possible."'17 Simi-
larly, Malcolm Shaw states, "statehood is inconceivable in the absence of a reasonably de-
fined geographical base." 4s On these bases, the world order created by the Westphalian
Peace Treaties is a geographically segmented one. The state, which constitutes its geo-
graphic unit, was conceived by the treaties to be a highly monopolistic and exclusive political
arrangement. Each state possesses the faculty of sovereignty, which grants it the exclusive
right to organise its internal affairs in any manner it perceives to be fit (internal sovereignty).
It further grants it full independence vis- -vis other states in the international order (ex-
ternal sovereignty). 49
In relation to the law, state internal sovereignty was translated into an understanding of
legal systems as an absolute monopoly of the state.5 0 Law has thus become synonymous
with state-law to the exclusion of any other possible sources of rules of conduct. 5' Con-
sequently, the state's territoriality and its sovereignty were reflected in the legal order, which
became predominantly territorial in its turn. The concept of state jurisdiction emerged to
delineate the scope within which each state exercises its "judicial, legislative, and adminis-
trative competence."" It is this jurisdictional aspect of territoriality that is most pertinent
to this article.
As part of public international law's traditional mission of delimiting the scope of exercise
of state powers,'" certain doctrinal, and sometimes, judicial principles relating to the legal
jurisdiction of the state have developed. 54 According to Ian Brownlie, "The starting-point
in this part of the law is the proposition that, at least as a presumption, jurisdiction is
territoriaL"'" (emphasis added). One should, however, distinguish between three types of
state legal jurisdiction: (1) prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction-referring to the state's
power to prescribe rules of law; (2) adjudicative jurisdiction-referring to its power to rule
judicially over legal questions; and (3) enforcement jurisdiction-meaning the state's power
to take action to enforce its laws or judicial decisions.5 6 While prescriptive and judicial
146. BROWNLIE, supra note 137, at 70-72; MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 139-44 (4th ed. 1997).
On the absence of legal definition of the state in international law, see J. H. W. VERzIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, vol. I, 266-69 (1968).
147. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. 1, 451 (8th ed. 1955), cited in Shaw, supra note 145, at 61.
148. Id.
149. See VERZIJL, supra note 146, at 256-66.
150. Austin's theory on law as the commands of the sovereign is one example of this view of the law. See
M. D. A. FREEMAN, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUJDENCE 213 (6th ed. 1994).
151. This state-centred understanding of legal systems has not passed unchallenged, see, e.g., ROGER COT-
TERRELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 29-31 (1984). For more recent challenges of this mo-
nopoly based on analysis of globalisation, see GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997);
BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEw COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARA-
DIG ATIC TRANSITION ch. 4 (1995).
152. BROWNLI, supra note 137, at 70-72; SHAW, supra note 146, at 301.
153. Shaw, supra note 145, at 73.
154. The Lotus Case (1927), PCU, Series. A, No. 10.
155. BROWNLIE, supra note 137, at 301.
156. M. CHERIF BASSIOtNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, VOL II: PROCEDURAL AND ENFORCEMENTMECH-
ANISMS 36 (2d ed. 1999).
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jurisdiction may be exercised on non-territorial basis, enforcement jurisdiction is strictly
territorial, except in rare and very exceptional cases.117 Considering that the effectiveness
of legal rules and judicial decisions is highly dependent on their enforcement, this strict
territoriality of the enforcement jurisdiction strengthens legal territoriality more generally.
Another distinction is made between jurisdiction over civil matters (civil jurisdiction) and
jurisdiction over criminal matters (criminal jurisdiction). Stretching the state's territorial
jurisdiction has been more tolerated in civil rather than criminal matters.5 8 This could be
explained on the basis of the particular nature of criminal law. It's more severely coercive
character, and the close link between crimes and the moral structure and values of the
society. All these features of criminal law make foreign criminal jurisdiction more of a threat
to the notions of state sovereignty and its exclusive authority within its territory.
While state sovereignty gives the state the right to exercise certain exclusive legal com-
petencies within a specific territory, such exclusivity should be enforced against other per-
sons of international law. This is captured by the external aspect of sovereignty and the
corollary duty of other states to refrain from interventing in any matter concerning another
state. One application of the principle of non-intervention in the legal sphere is the concept
of the reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction.'19 According to this concept, certain mat-
ters are reserved for the domestic jurisdiction of the state and are free from any binding
international law. The classic examples of such matters are nationality and immigration.
The importance of the concept of reserved domain should not be exaggerated. It is generally
accepted that the scope of the reserved domain is historically contingent. This means that
"no subject is irrevocably fixed within the reserved domain."' 60 Recent developments in
international law and the current expansion of its subject-matter supports this general view
and proves the limitations of the reserved domain as a principle.
The previous analysis leads one to conclude that the world order that has prevailed since
the seventeenth century is geographically fragmented. The state monopoly of legal ordering
has resulted in a legal system based on a presumption of territoriality. While this is not to
suggest that territoriality remained pure and exclusive of other criteria, territoriality con-
tinues to dominate the principles of legal jurisdiction.
2. Social and Economic De-Territoriality
Against this backdrop of legal territoriality, lawyers and lawmakers have been increasingly
confronted by forms of social and economic activities that break, to varying degrees, with
such territorial boundaries. Before one goes on to elaborate on this observation, it is im-
portant to indicate that the reference to economic and social de-territoriality remains a
reference to a partial phenomenon. De-territorialisation does not touch our social life in
any uniform degree. In analysing the globalisation question, one should always remember
that substantial aspects of our social life remain, in essence, territorial.
De-territorialisation of social life takes various forms. In one sense, de-territorialisation
can pertain to the fact that actions that are taking place strictly within the boundaries of
one country are having acute impacts across various territories. The typical example of de-
157. SHAW, supra note 146, at 452.
158. Id. at 457.
159. See generally BRowtIE, supra note 137, at 293-97; SHAw, supra note 146, at 454-55; VERZUL, supra
note 146, at 272-83.
160. BROwNLIE, supra note 137, at 293.
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territorialisation is environmental pollution. A local industry that is emitting excessive levels
of carbon dioxide is realistically affecting the life of all the inhabitants of the planet by
contributing to the threatening problem of global warming. Another example is the now
typical global repercussions of an initially national financial crisis, such as the Latin Amer-
ican debt crisis in the mid-1980s and the Asian financial crisis in 1997.16,
Largely due to technological changes in the area of telecommunication, social actions or
activities are increasingly de-territorial in themselves, rather than merely in terms of their
effect. One primary example is the geographic fragmentation of the production processes,
which sets the present era apart from earlier forms of internationalisation, which were based
on cross-border commerce rather than production. Robert Reich's example of an aeroplane
that is "designed in the state of Washington and in Japan, and assembled in Seattle, with
tail cones from Canada, special tail sections from China and Italy, and engines from Brit-
ain" 62 is worth repeating here for its illustrative value.
This geographic dispersal of production is caused and paralleled by another equally sig-
nificant process of de-territorialisation: that of the corporation. This phenomenon takes
place at various levels. Because of the capital markets' liberalisation, the company's own-
ership is now increasingly dispersed amongst shareholders of various countries. The free-
dom of incorporation has also resulted in companies repeatedly shifting their place of in-
corporation. The place of a company's operation is also frequently different from the
location of its decision-making machinery and its country of incorporation. The case of the
Bank for Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) can serve to illustrate this point.
BCCI signifies that de-territorialisation is not confined to the legal aspects of our social
life. Undergoing a very similar process of geographic expansion are the groups of organised
criminals that, until recently, constituted a local problem for certain countries, such as the
United States and Italy. According to studies of organised criminal activities, criminal or-
ganisations are forging major transnational alliances with similar organisations in other
countries and entering into informal agreements organised around common interests.
63
Such alliances are said to exist between groups as geographically disparate as the Chinese
Triads and the Colombian drug cartels. 164 This, it is argued, has spawned a globalisation of
illegal markets in drugs, arms, or illegal immigrants.1
65
The Internet takes this de-territorialisation of economic life to a different level. The act
of advertising goods and services on the Internet is an act the geographic scope of which
is expanding with every access to the site from a different country. This reality makes it
happening anywhere at any point of time. This makes tying such acts down to a single
territory mere arbitrariness. The spatial transformation brought by the Internet has been
strongly captured by one author stating that: "space is no longer in geography-it's in
electronics... there is a movement from geo- to chrono-politics: the distribution of ter-
ritory becomes the distribution of time." 166
161. The default of Mexico on its sovereign debt in 1984 triggered the Latin American crisis. On the other
hand the devaluation of the Thai Bhat triggered the Asian crisis.
162. REIcH, supra note 9, at 112.




166. JARROD WIENER, GLOBALIZATION AND THE HARMONIZATION OF LAW 7 (1999), in PAUL VIILIO, PURE
WAR 88 (1983).
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3. The Problematic Implications
The problematic implications of this mismatch for governance are now common place.
They are contemplated incessantly by lawyers. Simply stated, while national interests and
values are expressed in national laws territorially applicable, infringement of such interests
and values has a non-territorial character.
For example, the national interest in a sound and safe financial system is traditionally
expressed in national regulation of banking operations and capital adequacy standards. The
threat to a country's citizens and its national financial system can, however, result from
bank failures and financial crisis occurring in another, probably even remote country. This
has been illustrated by the BCCI case and the Barings case, as well as by the lessons of the
Asian financial crisis in 1997.
In situations of de-territorial impingement on national interests and values, the concerned
state might lack any form of jurisdiction over the offensive acts absent an aggressive appli-
cation of a "nationality principle" or "effect doctrine" to assert jurisdiction. In other cases,
the concerned country might have a prescriptive jurisdiction, in that its laws apply to the
offensive act, but lacks enforcement jurisdiction because of the presence of the offender,
the assets or even the documentary evidence outside its territory.
The mismatch dilemma is sometimes more subtle. This occurs particularly in relation to
the mobility of large capital and the geographic fluidity of multinational corporations. In
such cases, this mobility might create pressures on the domestic jurisdiction to abandon
pursuing certain national interests where this pursuit proves unfavourable or costly to busi-
ness. This phenomenon is commonly known as "regulatory competition" or "regulatory
arbitrage." Over the past few decades, labour rights and environmental protection have
repeatedly suffered such deregulatory pressures.
Globalisation, therefore, creates a situation where national interests either cannot be
pursued or cannot be protected because of the pressures of de-territoriality. This challenge
to governance has created demands for imaginative readjustment of our contemporary
structures and mechanisms of governing. A state-centred structure of governance is no
longer sufficient.
B. SOLVING THE GOVERNANCE PROBLEMATIC
The deep interdependence previously reflected makes protecting national interests and
values dependent in an increasing number of instances on the legislative and enforcement
policies of other countries. This has induced policymakers and academics to adopt and
advocate a number of responses ranging from (1) attempting to limit globalisation through
regulations, (2) stretching national jurisdiction through various controversial measures in-
cluding straightforward extraterritoriality, (3) harmonising their national laws, (4) privatis-
ing functions of government including policing, (5) co-operation on an extensive range of
matters, and (6) taking the extra leap of building structures of supranational governance.
De-globalisation through regulation is a defensive mechanism that seeks to avoid the
whole problem by returning to the status-quo ante. Stretching national jurisdiction, on the
other hand, while often achieved through consensual change in the principles of jurisdic-
tion, sometimes can become a very aggressive mechanism when such overreach is achieved
through unilateral assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Harmonisation (the third mech-
anism) and co-operation (the fifth mechanism) referred to above are of more collaborative
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albeit traditional nature involving concerted action between independent states. 167 Priva-
tisation of governance and building structures of supranational governance are probably
the two most innovative solutions to the governance vacuum in a globalising world. They
are thus perceived to be most disturbing to the established legal doctrines in both national
and international law.1
6 8
This article earlier discussed harmonisation and privatisation in detail as regulatory causes
of globalisation. Both instruments came to be used as solutions to the governance problem-
atic. In the area of policing, for example, in the face of the increasingly cross-border nature
of criminal activity, governments are relying more extensively on the financial sector to
provide intelligence of suspicious financial transactions that might lead to uncovering illegal
conduct. Similar reliance is also taking place in policing the Internet. Harmonisation of
laws was also relied on as a solution to regulatory arbitrage and forum shopping by economic
activities that hinder the countries' pursuit of their social and economic policies.
The inevitable territoriality of the state's enforcement jurisdiction has induced unprec-
edented co-operation amongst states in areas of regulatory and criminal enforcement. It
also induced co-operation in gathering evidence and information sharing.
This fragmented effort to deal with the problem of governance has resulted in a furore
of international and transnational activities that necessitated creating forums for continuous
debate and collaboration and, more recently, for agencies that attempt to manage and co-
ordinate this flood of governance activities at the global level. This has led to proliferation
of international agencies and to evolution in its forms and functions. The Bretton Woods
institutions, i.e., the IMF and the World Bank, have assumed new roles and functions.
169
Various groupings of states meeting at summitry level have started conducting policy dis-
cussion on a regular basis. The most significant of such summitries is G7/8. A myriad of
sub-governmental transnational groups organised as committees, task forces, or working
groups of informal structures have emerged and assumed great powers. Examples of such
agencies include the Basle Committee for Banking Supervision and the Financial Action
Task Force, 170 as well as many others.'
7
'
By way of illustration, this article will now tackle in more detail the first two mechanisms
for solving the governance vacuum, namely, de-globalisation through law and stretching
national jurisdiction. 171
167. For a taxonomy of the regulatory strategic options based on the degree of co-operation involved, see
Baum, Globalizing Capital Markets and Possible Regulatory Responses, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF GLOBALIZATION: CON-
FLICTS OF LAws, INTERNET, CAPITAL MARKETS AND INSOLVENCY IN A GLOBAL MARKET, supra note 133, at 87-
122.
168. Supranational governance challenges the principle of sovereignty as one of the basic principles of
international law. Privatisation of governance functions blurs the classic public/private dichotomy and chal-
lenges its validity as an organising legal distinction.
169. See Franqois Gianviti, Evolving Role and Challenges of the International Monetary Fund, 35 Ir'L LAw.
1369 (2002); see also IBAHSM SHiHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD, VOL. Im, 1-137 (2000); see
also Jost Delbriick, The Role of the United Nations in Dealing with Global Problems, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
277 (1997).
170. An interdisciplinary body created by the G7 in 1989 with the mandate of examining international co-
operation in the area of money laundering control.
171. Mario Giovanoli, A New Architecturefor the Global FinancialMarket: LegalAspects oflnternationalFinancial
Standard Setting, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAw: ISSUES FOR THE MILLENIUM 1, 3 (Mario Giovanoli ed.,
2000).
172. The other mechanisms are examined in a monograph to be published by the author in 2002.
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1. De-globalisation through Regulation
As argued earlier in this article, laws and regulations have played an instrumental role in
bringing about globalisation. It thus follows logically that the law can interfere once more
to reverse the tide of globalisation or to limit its flow. This can be achieved through laws
and regulations that impose restrictions on the free movement of goods, capital, and people,
or the free access to and use of telecommunication and information technologies. This de-
globalisation through law is one obvious and ready solution to the problems that global-
isation might raise.
The Internet is one of the primary technological globalisation instruments. Legal re-
strictions on Internet use and access represent a good example of de-globalisation through
law. While such attempts exist to one degree or another in all jurisdictions, China's case is
a discrete and illustrative one."3 China has perceived the clear financial and economic
benefits of globalisation. It has also become aware of the threats that this process can bring
about. The primary national interests that China perceived to be threatened by wide In-
ternet access were those of political control, state security, social cohesion, social stability,
public order, ideals of socialism, and the basic principles of the Constitution.)71 In order to
protect these values and interests while gleaning the benefits that the Internet could bring,
China is continuously attempting to regulate and control the use of the Internet.
China's regulatory system is based on limiting access to information on the Internet. To
achieve this objective, the Chinese government casts a wide regulatory net that catches In-
ternet Service Providers (ISP), Internet information providers, and all users of the Internet.
The regulations prohibit access to certain Internet sites and retrieval and distribution of
categories of information that the government perceives to be prejudicial to the national
interests and values. To enforce such regulations, the government uses filtering and blocking
technologies. It also imposes a cumbersome set of licensing and registtation requirements
upon Internet users, service providers, and information providers. The regulations governing
the Internet further impose wide policing requirements on ISPs and information providers.'
The efficacy of China's regulation of the Internet has been questioned.' 71 It is, however,
generally accepted that such tight control does deter ordinary users of the Internet in China,
even if it fails to deter tenacious and highly skilled ones."'
The threat of globalisation to the state's governance capacity is less obvious than in the
173. See Aaron D. McGeary, China's Great Balancing Act: Maximizing the Internet's Benefits While Limiting
its Detriments, 35 Ir'L LAw. 219 (2001); see also Scott Feir, Regulations Restricting Internet Access: Attempted
Repair of Rupture in China's Great Wall Restraining the Free Exchange of Idea, 6 PAC. RIM L. & PoL'Y J. 361
(1997); see also John Taylor, The Internet in China: Emharking on the "Information Superhighway" with One Hand
on the Wheel and the Other Hand on the Plug, 15 DICK. J. INTr'L L. 621 (1997).
174. In specifying their purpose, Chapter 1, § 1 of the Computer Information Network and Internet Security
Protection and Management Regulations (Dec. 30, 1997) stipulates that they seek to "preserve the social order
and social stability," in McGeary, supra note 173, at 226.
175. For an overview of these regulatory arrangements, see id. at 224-29. For a review of the Chinese
government agencies involved in Internet regulations, see Feir, supra note 173, at 368-71.
176. See McGeary, supra note 173, at 229-30; Feir, supra note 173, at 377-82; Taylor, supra note 173, at
637-39.
177. A senior Chinese government official noted that "the regulations were intended to deter those who
might casually visit blocked or banned sites and added [... 1 a person intent on accessing prohibited information
will find a way to access that information." McGeary, supra note 173, at 227.
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economic sphere. Financial liberalisation 7s and the consequent flood of capital flows across
borders have significantly undermined governments' monetary and economic autonomy.
Government monetary policy instruments are becoming increasingly ineffective under the
conditions of open economy and financial liberalisation. For example, the use of open market
operations to reduce liquidity in the economy is a traditional and effective instrument to
achieve stabilisation and control inflation under the conditions of a closed economy. In an
open economy with a iberalised capital account, such mechanisms could prove counter-
productive if it results in increasing interest rates and attracting more foreign investment. 79
Such governance problems, especially as manifested in the Mexican debt crisis in 1994 and
the Asian financial crisis in 1997, have resulted in re-examination of the value of financial
liberalisation and repeated resort to capital controls across the developing world. Capital
controls are another example of de-globalisation through regulation. They encompass a wide
range of regulatory measures imposed by a country for the purpose of controlling capital
flows crossing its borders. Examples of such measures include imposing a tax on capital in-
flows,18° imposing a non-remunerated reserve requirement on banks and private companies
for foreign currency obligations,' and imposing restrictions on foreign ownership.
Traditionally, capital controls were used to protect nationalist values by preventing the
control of foreign capital of domestic industries or of certain categories of industries that
were perceived to be strategic. Current capital controls are often employed to restore a
degree of monetary autonomy that allows governments to use monetary policy instruments
effectively and to achieve economic stabilisation.' 2 Capital controls are, therefore, often
used to insulate the economy temporarily until a government's monetary policy interven-
tions succeed. They are also used to influence the composition of capital inflows, mostly to
discourage short-term capital flows and favour long-term foreign investment."s3 It is now
commonly acknowledged that short-term capital flows, through the volatility they cause,
were key factors in the repeated financial crises in the 1990s.
De-globalisation through law is, therefore, a common remedy to the problems of gov-
ernance that globalisation creates. De-globalisation measures are incorporated in the key
international treaties that were concluded explicitly to promote the values of liberalisation.
Article VI, section 3 of the International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement provides,
"Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international capital
movements." Further, safeguard or escape clause measures have always been incorporated
in international trade agreements allowing parties to impose trade restrictions as an excep-
178. International financial liberalisation comprises "removal or restrictions on international capital move-
ments and the opening of the domestic financial sector to foreign competition." NATALIA TASMIosA, TRADE IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 4 (IMF Working Paper No. 89, 1999).
179. Neal McKnight, Stepping Stones to Reform: The Use of Capital Controls in Economic Liberalization, 82 VA.
L. REV. 859, 877 (1996).
180. In 1994, Brazil imposed a 1 percent tax on foreign investment in the stock market. Id. at 885.
181. For a detailed analysis of the Chilean experience with non-remunerated reserve requirement, see Ber-
nard Laurens, Chile's Experience with Controls on Capital Inflows in the 1990s, reprinted in AKIRA ARIYOSHI r AL.,
CAPITAL CONTROLS: Courav EXPERIENCES WrrH THEIR USE& LIBERA. IzATIONs, app. I, at 69 (IMF Occasional
Paper No. 190, 2000).
182. Id. at 70; Inci Otker-Robe, Malaysia's Experience with the Use of Capital Controls, reprinted in AxIRA
ARIYOSHI ET AL., CAPITAL CONTROLS: CouNTRY EXPERIENCES WITH THEIR USE & LIBERALZATIONS, app. 3, at
96 (IMF Occasional Paper No. 190, 2000). Both studies confirm that gaining monetary policy autonomy was
one of the primary objectives of imposing capital controls.
183. For a discussion of the rationales of capital controls, see McKnight, supra note 179, at 879-83.
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tion to their trade liberalisation obligations under certain circumstances. 8 4 Article XIX of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade gives the contracting party a broad escape
clause that permits, in circumstances that pose a threat to domestic industries, "to suspend
the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession." 85 The effec-
tiveness of such remedies is in its turn problematic and their impact on economic growth
is often argued to be negative. Nevertheless, they remain some of the most readily used
responses to the governance challenge of globalisation.
2. Stretching National Jurisdiction"'8
As explained in the discussion of the legal problematic of globalisation, the jurisdictional
territoriality of the law unmatched by de-territoriality in the social and economic spheres
have produced the governance vacuum that troubles lawyers. Throughout its history, the
principle of territoriality has been increasingly challenged by changes in the geography of
social and economic relations brought about by developments in transportation and com-
munication technologies. In response, lawyers have been innovative in developing other
jurisdictional principles that stretch beyond the state's reach its defined territory or in other
words, localise acts that could otherwise fall outside the ambit of its jurisdiction. According
to Harvard Research on Jurisdiction of Crime (1935), "Indeed with the increasing facility
of communication and transportation the opportunities for committing crimes whose con-
stituent elements take place in more than one state have grown apace. To meet these con-
ditions, the jurisdiction of crime founded upon the territorial principle has been expanded
in several ways."" 7
The pressure of a mobile social and economic reality is evident in the now classic defi-
nition of the territorial principle in criminal law. According to article 3 of the Harvard Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, "A State has jurisdiction with respect
to any crime committed in whole or in part within its territory." 8 (emphasis added). A crime
is committed in whole within a state's territory when all its constituent parts (the conduct
and the criminal result) have taken place within that territory. Some crimes, however, start
within the state's territory but are consummated outside that territory. Alternatively, a crime
could start outside the territory of a state, but produce its criminal result within the state's
territory. The latter two cases fall within the jurisdiction of the state on basis of the terri-
torial principle as crime committed in part within its territory.
This development in the territorial principle constitutes one of the first attempts to
expand the doctrine in response to economic and social mobility. 89 The principle has, thus,
differentiated into subjective territoriality,'9 where part of the criminal conduct takes place
184. For a general discussion of safeguard policies in international trade arrangements, see JACKSON, supra
note 117, at 175-213.
185. GATT art. XIX, para. 1(a).
186. Note that this section's discussion focuses on the state's criminal and regulatory jurisdiction rather than
the civil jurisdiction. It is at the area of public law that the governance vacuum has been more felt.
187. Harvard Research on Jurisdiction of Crime, 29 Am.J. IvsT'L L. Supp. (1935) at 484, cited in Lotika Sarkar,
The Proper Law of Crime in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 50 (Gerhard Mueller & Edward
Wise eds., 1965).
188. Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime,
reproduced in INTERNATIONAL CRImINAL LAW 41-46 (Gerhard Mueller & Edward Wise eds., 1965).
189. For a brief historical overview, see Lotika Sarkar, The Proper Law of Crime in International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL CIMiNAL LAw 51-61 (Gerhard Mueller & Edward Wise eds., 1965).
190. See generally Christopher L. Blakesly, Ertraterritorial Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
47-50 (Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999).
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in the territory of the state, while its result or its effect takes place abroad, and objective
territoriality,191 where the result of a criminal conduct carried out abroad takes effect within
the territory of the state.
While traditionally accepted as basis for criminal jurisdiction, the nationality principle'92
expands the scope of state jurisdiction beyond its territory and, therefore, forms a helpful tool
in dealing with the governance vacuum created by social and economic mobility. According
to this principle, a state's laws and regulations apply to its citizens wherever they are. The
universal acceptance of this principle stems from its grounding in the basic concept of state
sovereignty. This principle brings within state jurisdiction violations of its laws committed by
any of its citizens, regardless of the place where such violation has been committed.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction has also been achieved through another jurisdictional prin-
ciple referred to as the protective principle.'9 According to this principle, jurisdiction over
a crime is assumed, even if it doesn't occur in whole or in part within the state's territory,
nor produces any physical harm within that territory, provided it threatens the security,
integrity, or sovereignty of that state. Typical examples of such crimes are terrorism when
it is directed against the state's interests outside its territory and counterfeiting of a state
currency. The rationale for extending the jurisdiction in such cases lies in the fact that the
state in which the acts are committed may not be interested in prosecuting an offence
directed against the interests of another state. The protective principle is now generally
recognised as a principle of jurisdiction and has historically been used to deal with extra-
territorial threats of political nature.
Where coherent international public policy has emerged, a principle of universality has
been adopted to secure prosecution of acts that violate such globally recognised interest.
With regard to such violations, international law goes beyond merely granting any country,
within whose jurisdiction the accused might be present, the right to prosecute. It further
imposes upon such country the duty to carry out this prosecution or, alternatively, extradite
the accused to another country that is willing to perform this duty. The crimes for which
a principle of universality applies include war crimes, genocide, apartheid, hijacking, and
sabotage of civil aircraft.- 9
More recently, there have been further attempts, mainly by the United States, to further
expand the reach of national jurisdiction for purposes of economic regulations. Such expansion
was attempted as a solution to the overreaching effects that an economic behaviour carried
out and completed outside the territory of one country might have within its territory. In
response, the "effect doctrine" has emerged. According to this doctrine, a state has jurisdiction
over conduct carried out outside its territory if that conduct has or intended to have substantial
effect within its territory. 19 It has been argued that this doctrine is consistent with and based
on the principle of territoriality in its objective formulation. The reality is the effect doctrine
relaxes the nexus between the conduct and its consequences in a manner that permits applying
the state's law to a conduct that has been performed and completed outside its territory, but
191. See id. at 50-54.
192. Id.; BROWNLIE, supra note 137, at 306; A.D. NEALE & M.L. STEPHENS, INTEENATIA!oNA BUSINESS AND
NATioNALJuEisDncTioN 15-17 (1988).
193. Blakesly, supra note 192, at 54-61; BROWNLIE, supra note 137, at 307.
194. Blakesly, supra note 192, at 70-81; BROWNLIE, supra note 192, at 307-09.
195. NEA.E & STEPHENS, supra note 192, at 167.
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that might have repercussions within its territory. Such repercussions need not be part of the
criminal conduct or a constituent element of the offence.
The facts of United States v. Aluminum Company ofAmerica (Akoa), 96 the case establishing
the effects doctrine illustrates the distinction between the effects in the context of objective
territoriality and the effects as encompassed in the effects doctrine. In Alcoa, U.S. law was
applied to Aluminium Company, a foreign company, penalising its act of organising a cartel
operating through a Swiss corporation with a number of other foreign companies under
U.S. law. The United States had jurisdiction because the cartel's operations resulted in
restricting imports of aluminum into the United States and consequently pushing up the
prices. On settling the jurisdictional question, the court stipulated, "it is settled law ... that
any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct
outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends." 197
This case and the effects accepted as a basis for jurisdiction are clearly distinct from the
effects envisioned in the objective territoriality principle.98 The classic illustrative case of
the objective territoriality principle is that of a murderer who fires a shot across the border
from Italy, wounding the victim in France, who then subsequently succumbs to his death
in Switzerland. While the death is a constituent element of the offence in this hypothetical
case, the subsequent impact of the cartel on the U.S. aluminum market is not an element
of the penalised restraint of trade. It is merely a subsequent and remote repercussion.
The U.S. expansionary jurisdictional inclinations that have been increasingly manifested
over the past few decades are not confined to prescriptive jurisdiction. As earlier indicated in
this article, despite developments in jurisdiction theory over the decades, enforcement juris-
diction continues to be strictly territorial. This, however, did not hold against recent U.S.
expansionary trends. Extraterritorial enforcement actions are increasingly resorted to by U.S.
courts. This takes various forms including: (1) demanding the disclosure of evidence that is
held abroad sometimes in breach of foreign statutory requirements; (2) imposing remedies
on foreign companies in civil anti-trust cases, such as requiring foreign firms to make know-
how available to competitors on reasonable basis; and (3) imposing American export regula-
tions on foreign companies who have any link with the United States such as being foreign
subsidiaries to an American parent company or merely using American technology.199
In conclusion, stretching the national jurisdiction through various legal and doctrinal
vehicles is increasingly being resorted to in order to bridge the governance gap. Such
development is not without its problems. Over assertiveness of jurisdiction by one country
often results in antagonising other countries and invoking conflict and retaliatory actions.
196. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. Am., 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
197. Id. at 443.
198.
The type of 'effect' which the Akoa ruling has in mind has nothing in common with the effect, which
by virtue of established principles of international jurisdiction confers the right of regulation. The
'effect' within the meaning of Akoa ruling does not amount to an essential element or constituent part
of the restraint of trade, but is an indirect or remote repercussion of a restraint carried out, completed
and in the legally relevant sense, exhausted in the foreign country.
F. A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jnurisdiction, in International Law, RECUEIL DES COURS 104 (1964), in NEALE &
STEPHENS, suJpra note 192, at 168.
199. For a detailed analysis and evaluation of such cases and bibliographic reference, see NEALE & STEPHENS,
supra note 192, chs. 9 & 11.
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This, in turn, undermines other productive forms of co-operation that are most needed as
a solution to the governance vacuum.
VI. Conclusion
This article has sought to fulfill a certain vacuum in the legal writing on globalisation by
attempting to introduce a degree of systematisation to the understanding of the globalisa-
tion process and its implications within the law. This article argues for an understanding
of globalisation as a process of social change that is both geographic and political. It is
geographic in that its technological and regulatory causes have altered the space of social
activities and has given them de-territorial nature. That is a nature that defeats realistic and
non-arbitrary localisation. On the other hand, the process is political in that it shifts the
balance of power in the society from the state to other non-state actors, both at the inter-
national and national levels. It is thus argued that the word "global" is used as much for its
geographic connotation as it is used for its omission of the state.
While it is accepted and argued that this whole process of change is technological in
nature, the role of law and regulatory arrangements in bringing it about is equally signifi-
cant. The retreat of the interventionist state in the 1970s and 1980s and the attendant
measures of de-regulation, liberalisation and privatisation were essential for bringing about
globalisation. This feature of globalisation leads to the conclusion that if law can cause
globalisation, then legal arrangements may manage it or even arguably reverse it.
Globalisation, to lawyers, is a problem of governance created primarily by the mismatching
geography of social activity and the law that regulates it. Any legal response must attempt to
bridge this geographic gap or to fill it. It has been argued that six legal responses could be
envisioned: de-globahsation, stretching national borders, harmonisation, privatisation, co-
operation, and creating supranational governance. So far, the legal response has encompassed
each of these possible strategies to varying degrees in different areas. The scheme of global
governance at this stage is hardly schematic. It is a very complex decentralised web of mixed
strategies that sometimes conflict with very limited capacity for co-ordination.
The limitations of each of these strategies did not go unnoticed. Lawyers are in consonant
debate about the value of each of these solutions. What however looms large is the dem-
ocratic and legitimacy deficit that characterises the emerging decentralised global order.
These issues have thus far been postponed on the basis that "partial solutions are preferable
to no solution at all."2c° However, if globalisation is here to stay, and if the system of
governing globalisation is to mature, then the nuances of legitimacy, democracy, and due
process should be addressed promptly, realistically, and systematically.
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